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USE OF THE CRITICAL INCIDENT METHOD
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to systematically describe the be­
havior being elicited by business games giving consideration to their
possible use as predictors of managerial success. Such an investigation 
is necessary before games can be used to any extent for statistical 
studies in organizational research. Although there are many types of 
games being used in education and industry today, ones classified as 
simulations can be distinguished from others rather well by the follow­
ing definitions and clarification:
The word game in this discussion means a competitive mental 
activity wherein opponents compete through the development and im­
plementation of an economic strategy. The three basic components 
of a simulation are an abstraction of an economic environment, or 
a model, a series of rules for manipulation of the model, or simu­
lation, and a set of rules which govern the activity of participants 
in relation to the simulation, a game. The competitive activity is 
governed by the economic model which is a facsimile environment 
whose basic design the participants cannot control.1
The need for a selection instrument based on a simulation arises 
out of the inherent weaknesses of selection devices now in use. The
^James L. McKenney, Simulation Gaming for Management Development 
(Boston: Harvard University, 1967), p. 2.
2advantage of a simulation as a performance measurement device lies
largely in its ability to provide the dynamic and complex environment
which is lacking in pencil tests and which is also non-interactive and
2
often unrealistic in projective assessment devices.
Sociometric methods such as those used by the military in World 
War II point to some of the additional attributes desired by an adequate 
selection device. In the military case, a platoon of potential officer 
candidates trained and lived together for several weeks. This allowed 
great opportunity for candidates to observe each other under many and 
varied situations. In other words, opportunity to observe performance 
and to evaluate potential in an applied environment, with dynamic inter­
active elements, was present. A second unique characteristic interjected 
by the military was the use of buddy ratings. This allows more dimen­
sions of behavior to be observed than if a supervisor alone did the rat­
ing and is likely to be more high]y correlated with actual success as 
defined by organizational goals.
Another attribute of sociometric techniques is the fact that 
they do not require the rater to explain the reason for his evaluation. 
Persons are simply asked to give their overall impression about an indi­
vidual, perhaps in terms of characteristics, assigning points to 
categories such as intelligence and honesty, but with overall points 
determining the candidate's aptitude for a certain job. Again, Leavitt's 
rationale for this type of rating is perceptive:
The sociometric method thereby short-cuts across an area of great 
difficulty, since both our language and our communicable knowledge
^Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (Chicago: The Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 104.
about men are usually inadequate. Moreover, what we know about per­
sonality, however inadequate, suggests that personality is not a 
thing to be torn apart and dealt with as a set of separable elements 
but is more susceptible to a kind of all-at-once, whole-man evalua­
tion. . . . Personality, if it can be thought of as an entity at 
all, is an elaborately interactive and dynamic kind of entity. When 
sociometrically, one simply asks men to make an overall judgment of 
one another, one is, in a way, automatically taking the wholeness 
of personality into account.^
The advantages of rating the whole personality in this manner 
must, of course, be weighted against the dangers of bias and distortion 
so easily engendered by such broadly structured ratings.
More recently the interjection of a dynamic environmental setting 
has been attempted by an in-basket game.^ This should not be confused 
with a business simulation as defined above, since it lacks the well- 
defined economic model, generally requires only individual decisions 
without group interaction, and does not include job duties that cannot 
be simulated by incoming mail. Of course, the in-basket game does simu­
late written communications required by executives and, in that limited 
sense, is a logical extension of the business game.
William Dill, a pioneer in the use of games, developed a crite­
rion for the use of business games for assessing man as early as 1962.
He said:
It is reasonable to use games to assess men if— but only if—  
three conditions are met:
1. We must have a criterion so that we know what kind of
men we are looking for. (This gets increasingly difficult as
we move into the more individualized positions in the upper
^Ibid., p. 114.
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Felix M. Lopez, Jr., Evaluating Executive Decision Making: The
In-Basket Technique, American Management Association Research Study,
No. 75 (New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1966), p. 31.
echelons of management.)
2. We must have a theory, a system of measuring behavior, and
some experience that will let us interpret the meaning of the behav­
ior that our candidates display.
3. We must have adequate control over the way the game develops
so that we understand the stimuli that the man is responding to and
the reasons why he chose to behave as he did.^
Statement of the Problem
It is hypothesized that the critical incident technique, to be 
described later, which has been used in several instances to develop 
performance evaluation instruments and job requirements, can be used 
successfully to describe the managerial behavior being elicited by busi­
ness games.
If Dill is correct in the requirements for assessing men quoted 
earlier, a system of measuring the diverse behavior elicited in games is 
necessary for further work in this area. For this reason his requirement 
number 2, the development of such a system, will be the central empiri­
cal focus of this paper.
In addition to the test of the above hypothesis through primary 
research, the secondary research included in this thesis attempts to 
answer the following questions:
1. What is the best criterion available in the literature for 
a measure of managerial success?
2. How well can business game environments and game develop­
ments be controlled?
William R. Dill, "What Management Games Do Best," Carnegie In­
stitute of Technology: Graduate School of Industrial Administration,
Reprint No. 90, 1962, p. 62.
53. Can a relationship be observed between behavior empirically 
sampled from game participants and. the criterion of successful manage­
rial performance to be described later?
4. Can a clear, well-defined path be derived for further re­
search in this area relating managerial success on the job to that 
elicited by games, which will allow the development of the latter as a 
predictor of success for the former?
Research Design and Scope
The raw data for use in describing behavior evoked by games was 
obtained by questionnaires completed by several undergraduate business
classes and by a nationwide mailed questionnaire to professors in the 
member schools of the American Association of Collegiate Schools of 
Business.
The research design and termination point can be depicted by 
referring to the model shown in Figure 1 on the following page. First, 
the study summarizes, from the literature, some overall goals typical 
of those used by businesses (Block 1). Thus recognition was given to 
the idea that only goal-oriented managerial behavior can be considered 
effective from the organization's viewpoint. Next, types of executive 
performance that contribute to the goals of an organization were reviewed 
and summarized as suggested in Block 2.
The primary research reported in this study centered around Block 
3 of Figure 1. It consisted of a collection of behavioral incidents (per­
formance specimens) from several surveys of business game observers. The 
study was terminated with a systematic presentation of the kinds of
A SYSTEMATIC MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS GAMES PARTICIPATION 
AS A PREDICTOR OF MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS IN INDUSTRY
Deflng
Goals
Perform
Validation
Studies
Compare Incidents 
in Blocks 3 and 4 
and Adjust Game 
for Conformity
Collect Incidents 
that Contribute 
to Block 2 from 
Businessmen
Define Executive 
Factors Contributing 
to Goals**
Collect Incidents 
that Contribute 
to Block 2 from 
Game Observers
Includes items such as :
Profits
ROI
Market Share 
Company Image 
Value of Stock
**
Includes items such as:
Profits (if can be isolated in 
totality)
Efficiency
Maintenance of good relations 
Development of realistic plans 
Development of high morale 
Development of competent subordinates 
Fostering of good public relations
Figure I
7managerial behavior discovered to be frequently occurring in business 
games. Blocks 4, 5, and 6 of Figure 1 represent suggestions for future 
research in developing business games for predictive purposes.
Block 4, of Figure 1, suggests that incidents representing mana­
gerial behavior be collected from businesses. Block 5 proposes that 
game behavior be brought into closer similarity to on-the-job behavior 
by an adjustment of game rules and models. Block 6 suggests that vali­
dation studies should be undertaken to determine whether or not game 
success accurately predicts on-the-job success once the earlier stages 
of Figure 1 are completed.
Definition of Terms
Game. As used in this thesis this concept includes three com­
ponents: an abstraction of an economic environment, or model, rules
for manipulation of the model, or simulation, and a set of rules which 
gives the activity of the participants in relation to the simulation.
Dynamic Game. A game whose variables, such as the index of 
economic activity, are constantly changing.
Interactive Game. A game in which the competitive environment 
is determined largely by the game participants. Decisions of one team 
affect the outcome of decisions of competitors.
Aggregative Decision. A quantitative input that controls the 
activity of a total functional area, such as the dollar amount spent on 
advertising. A "non-aggregate" decision would include advertising 
schedules and media styles.
Manager. This term will be used interchangeably with the terms 
"executive" and "supervisor" to mean a person who has responsibility for
8the work of others. Generally the term "executive" will be used to mean 
persons at the divisional level of a corporation, or higher, and the teirm 
"supervisor" will be used to refer to persons below the plant level. How­
ever, the sources cited are not consistent in the usage of these terms 
and the context of each discussion will be relied upon to make the meaning 
clear in each case.
Performance Specimen. An isolated behavioral incident judged to 
be critical to successful managerial performance by a respondent and ob­
served by that respondent.
Critical Incident. A more general statement representing a com­
bination of very similar performance specimens.
Factor. A major functional area of activity made up of a number 
of similar critical incidents.
Organization of the Study
This study is organized into six chapters:
Chapter I gives the rationale for the study, the statement of 
the hypothesis, a conceptual model that explains the development of the 
paper and defines the special terms used.
Chapter II contains a review of the literature concerning the 
activities of management at various hierarchical levels and of the mea­
sures of success typically used for managers.
Chapter III contains a review of literature about business games 
with a special emphasis on the managerial environment created by them.
Chapter IV extends the review of business game literature to 
information about the use of games as evaluation or selection devices.
9It also explores the attempts of industry to measure managerial effec­
tiveness with a special interest in methods that might be transferable 
to business game evaluation. The critical incident method was discovered 
to be the most promising technique for describing managerial behavior 
elicited by games.
Chapter V describes an empirical research study using the criti­
cal incident method to describe managerial behavior being elicited by 
business games throughout the nation. The results of the study are 
analyzed.
Chapter VI presents a summary and conclusions.
CHAPTER II
A CRITERION OF SUCCESSFUL MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 
IN BUSINESS GAMES
One of the most extensive studies attempting to measure manage­
rial behavior is that of Felix Lopez's AMA Research Study using an 
in-basket game. In his description of the process for designing in­
basket games for evaluation, he enumerates three key phases in the 
process: (1) job analysis, (2) selection of emphasis, and (3) delinea­
tion of purpose.^ By suggesting the analysis, Lopez is essentially 
saying, as did Dill, that we need to know "what kind of men we are look­
ing for." After the position or the group of positions for which we are 
trying to predict a successful incumbent are defined, these can be used 
as a criterion of managerial success.
This chapter will provide an account of a review of literature 
in an attempt to define the essential characteristics of the manager's 
job.
A Review of Managerial Success Criteria
A major problem in developing an evaluation standard for manage^ 
ment is the task of obtaining agreement among and within business as to 
what constitutes the most important goals of the organization.
Felix M. Lopez, Jr., Evaluating Executive Decision Making: The
In-Basket Technique, American Management Association Research Study, No. 
75 (New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1966), pp. 27-43.
10
11
Furthermore, some priority ranking must be assigned to organizational 
goals so that proper emphasis will be applied. Finally, a balance be­
tween long- and short-term goals must be obtained. For example, profits 
are usually agreed upon as a prime goal of an organization, but, "It is 
usually not the purpose of an organization to increase immediate profits
at any cost, e.g., by wiping out its research program or by failing to
2
maintain its capital equipment."
General Electric has developed a list of departmental operating 
effectiveness criteria which has been circulated to all its managers. 
Their eight key results are:
1. Profitability (financial returns).
2. Market position.
3. Productivity (effective and balanced utilization of men, 
capital, and raw materials).
4. Technological leadership in products and services to fill 
the customers' needs.
5. Personnel development (managerial and functional).
6. Employee attitudes (including managers and specialists).
7. Public responsibility.
3
8. Balance between short-range and long-range goals.
Another study in the literature which represents an empirical
attempt to describe the executive's job by means of a questionnaire was
^Stanley M. Nealey and Fred E. Fiedler, "Leadership Functions of 
Middle Managers," Psychological Bulletin, LXX, No. 5 (1968), pp. 319-322-
^Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, Assessing Managerial 
Potential, Report of a Seminar (Ann Arbor, Michigan and Gould House, 
Ardsley-on-Hudson, New York: Foundation for Research on Human Behavior,
1957) , pp. 6-9.
12
developed by asking 93 executives of 5 large corporations belonging to the 
"Executive Study" to complete a 575-item questionnaire. According to 
Lopez :
The completed instrument, when scored, yields a profile of the 
position on ten common dimensions:
1. Providing a staff service in nonoperational areas. (Gather­
ing information, selecting employees, briefing superiors, 
checking statements, verifying facts, and making recommenda­
tions. )
2. Supervision of work. (Planning, organization, and control­
ling the work of others.)
3. Business control. (Cost reduction, maintenance of inven­
tories, preparation of budgets, justification of capital 
expenditures.)
4. Technical aspects of products and markets. (Development of 
new business, marketing, anticipating changes in demand for 
products.)
5. Human, community, and social affairs. (Concerned with good­
will of company goals, evaluation of new ideas.)
6. Long-range planning. (Oriented toward future of company, 
company goals, evaluation of new ideas.)
7. Exercise of broad power or authority. (Makes recommendations 
on very important matters, interprets policy.)
8. Business reputation. (Product design, quality, and improve­
ments, delivery schedules, complaints about products or 
services.)
9. Personal demands. (Concerned about the propriety of the 
manager's behavior.)
10. Preservation of assets. (Capital expenditures, large expen­
ditures such as taxes, operations.)^
Hemphill found some combination of these ten factors in every 
management position explored. The degree to which any factor
^Lopez, Evaluating Executive Decision Making, p. 30.
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predominated depended on (1) the business function managed (personnel, 
marketing, finance) , (2) the type of enterprise engaged in (manufactur­
ing, banking, government), and (3) the level of the hierarchy at which 
the executive was employed. He found that, "Higher level executive 
positions, . . . emphasize such factors as long-range planning, exer­
cise of broad power or authority, and the preservation of assets, 
while lower staff positions are more inclined to be involved in super­
vision of work, provision of staff service, and technical aspects of 
products and markets."^
In one of the most extensive studies that has been performed in 
this area, the Educational Testing Service (ETS) at Princeton University 
performed a survey . . of a wide variety of organizations to learn 
what criteria (reflecting organizational goals) are most often used in 
evaluating the effectiveness of managerial personnel." These were in 
turn synthesized into a list of "Seven Expressions of Executive Effec­
tiveness." They are listed with their clarifications summarized below:
1. His organization produces profits. ETS emphasizes that
profits can rarely stand alone as an indicator of success because of the 
lack of complete control cf toe organization by one man and because of 
the possibility of sacrificing long-run profits for short-run profits 
through the inadequate maintenance of physical and human resources.
2. He operates efficiently. This measure would include the use 
of input-output analysis, cost-accounting procedures, budgets, and real­
istic goal-setting, in such a way as to reduce costs to a minimum and 
maximize results.
^Ibid.
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3. He maintains "good" relations with others in the organiza­
tion. This is a difficult area to appraise, but ETS is sure that it 
includes such things as " . . . avoiding personal conflicts, observing 
customs and traditions, displaying loyalty to the organization, etc. . .
4. He makes realistic plans for the future. The emphasis nere 
is on the results achieved by each plan instituted by an executive. ETS 
makes the approach clear by stating that, "Even though success or fail­
ure may well have resulted from factors over which we had no control, 
his reputation depends on his batting average, and perhaps more on the 
strikeouts and home runs than on the number of base hits."
5. He develops high morale. ETS says that this factor is 
" . . .  frequently studied through morale surveys and indicators such
as employee turnover, absenteeism, labor grievances, extent of voluntary 
participation in benefit plans, etc."
6. He develops the competence of his subordinates. ETS notes 
that this is measured largely by the use of subjective ratings.
7. He fosters good public relations. One chief way in which 
this can be accomplished is through active participation in civic 
affairs
It should be noted that the term "executive" above is used in a 
general way to denote most levels of management.
Hierarchical Distinctions in the Definition of Success
An extensive study was performed by Nealey and Fiedler in which 
they explored job demands at various hierarchical levels and from which
^Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, Assessing Managerial
Potential, pp. 6-7.
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the following generalizations could be made.
First-level supervisors work under considerable time pressure 
and have frequent and direct contact with the workers. Their orientation 
is more often downward, whereas second-level managers spend more time 
with their superiors and usually have an upward orientation. Second- 
level managers usually require less technical expertise and more general 
knowledge of several departments. Since they are more removed by tech­
nological, geographical, and time barriers from the work situation, they 
must rely on the formal power of their position more than their personal 
and technical ability. This also required them to communicate more often 
by means of formal communication, such as memoranda, letters, and the 
telephone. The primary function of middle management is interpolation, 
that is, of knowing how to get what from whom and to maintain the pipe­
lines of his suborganization to other components of his organization.^
One study revealed four major classes of functions required of 
the middle manager: " . . .(1) planning, (2) decision functions, (3)
supervisory and human relations functions, and (4) communications func­
tions .
A review of management styles over the past forty years indicates 
that a definition of satisfactory middle-management behavior depends 
largely on how one defines the goals of the organization. When jobs were 
scarce in the 1920's and 1930's and industry was tuned largely to
^Nealey and Fiedler, Leadership Functions, pp. 319-322.
g
Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, Assessing Managerial 
Potential, pp. 6-9.
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"getting out the product," the typical manager " . . .  was characterized 
as the tough, hard-nosed, bull-of-the-woods, tobacco-chewing type guy 
. . . "  who was probably as good at dealing with a hammer and pliers as
9
with men. With the coming of the World War II years, immigration, and 
a labor shortage, "human relations" styled management began to flourish. 
When the overproduction and spiraling costs of the late 1940's and early 
1950's hit business, a third style of middle management developed defined 
by one writer as "management by pressure." He continued to explain that 
management goals became focused on short-term results. "Management 
development emphasized such things as budget controls, improving mecha­
nized methods and redesigning of products with the idea of engineering 
costs out of the product.
Since middle management was being evaluated almost entirely on 
immediate results, their decisions began to reflect short-run expediency 
at the expense of long-run goals. The result, of course, was that 
problem-solving decisions tended to create more problems than they 
solved. Consequently top management again communicated a different set 
of goals and objectives, stressing that middle management would be eval­
uated on a balanced criterion of long- and short-run goals. One writer 
has captioned this new approach "management of situations.
The author's comment about the appraisal system being used for 
this type of manager is particularly relevant to this discussion:
^Jerry T. Emrick, "Training and Development of Middle Managers," 
Advanced Management Journal, XXX, No. 4 (October, 1965), p. 52.
lOlbid., p. 54
lllbid.
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Evaluating a man by use of a checklist of personality factors, 
in terms of how well ha fits somebody's preconceived idea of what a 
manager's character ought to be is now passe. We are becoming more 
and more concerned with questions like, "Does he or does he not 
accomplish the goals and objectives expected to be achieved by a per­
son in his position, and to what degree?" A related question is,
"How does he accomplish these goals
The next major division in the management hierarchy can probably 
be drawn at the distinction between a middle manager and a top manager 
or executive. Although the lines are shaded, it seems that the chief 
characteristic of an executive position is the responsibility for pol­
icy making in the organization. It should be emphasized that various
studies have found a high degree of overlap between the functions of
13managers at all levels of the hierarchy.
David W. Ewing divides executive work into three distinct areas 
distinguished by the type of knowledge needed for each:
1. Knowledge of methods and techniques, useful in devising 
answers to specific problems.
2. Knowledge of important realities, conditions, and trends 
affecting the nature of a business situation, which helps in 
understanding the needs for action.
3. Knowledge of what goals, policies, and procedures are desir­
able for the organization.
He cautions that, "The layers sometimes run into each other and 
are not neatly distinguishable, but they differ in e m p h a s i s . A l t h o u g h  
the writer is not explicit on this point, he does imply that the
l^Ibid. , p. 55 .
l^Nealey and Fiedler, Leadership Functions," p. 320.
l^David W. Ewing, "The Knowledge of an Executive," Guideposts to 
Executive Growth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1956-1965), p. 73.
l^ Ibid.
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knowledge required progresses in an orderly fashion (moving from one to 
three) as one moves up the managerial hierarchy. Ewing fails to distin­
guish clearly between the executive level and other levels of management,
Chester Barnard in a classic book introduced what he considers 
to be "the essential executive functions";
They are, first, to provide the system of communication; second, 
to promote the securing of essential efforts; and third, to formulate 
and define purpose.
In a much later intensive study of managerial potential this 
point of emphasis came to the forefront again. First, the upper level 
of management was depicted as the role of a navigator, requiring a great 
amount of judgmental and conceptual abilities. Secondly, the top man 
was depicted as one needing integrating abilities " . . .  to fit together 
bits of information from different sources. He must sense, or even im­
pose, a pattern where none appears to be."^^ Finally, this research 
group found that top people must have many of the lower level skills, if 
for no other reason but to reach upper-level management.
Any attempt to compare the functions of management as described 
by the various studies above may suffer from the foible of trying to add 
apples and oranges. However, there does seem to be a current of thought 
running through the studies which is descriptive of the various levels 
of management.
fhe higher one moves toward the top of an organization the easier 
it is to evaluate his effectiveness on the basis of the achievement of
^^Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of an Executive (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 217.
^^Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, Assessing Managerial 
Potential. p. 4.
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organizational goals. Another way of viewing this would be to say that 
at the lower levels of an organization the goals and objectives become 
so splintered and so diverse that it is often difficult to trace the 
effects of an activity back to the key objectives of the overall organ­
ization. Not only is the performance of the top manager expected to be 
aligned closely with goal achievement, but the major knowledge require­
ment for him is that of goals, policies, and procedures, many of which 
he must establish himself. He is expected to be well endowed with judg­
mental and conceptual abilities and to be able to integrate the diverse 
activities of the organization. The day-to-day activities that he could 
be observed performing would be largely those of planning and directing; 
however, he might engage in a goodly amount of supervision. His orien­
tation is probably outward toward the customer, the public, and the 
stockholders.
The middle manager's chief responsibility is to maintain an 
interpolation and communication system for the goals and policies formu­
lated by top management. He must be acutely aware of the realities, 
conditions and trends of his firm and position, and must have enough 
knowledge of methods and techniques to convert goals and policies into 
methods for their accomplishment. Since the knowledge of methods and 
techniques were probably acquired on the way up the managerial hierarchy, 
his chief concern is in establishing the proper communication networks 
through organizational design that will allow either the adjustment of 
these goals and policies to fit his people, or the adjustment of the 
people so that they will accept the goals. Since his previous experiences
20
have given him an adequate knowledge of the work situation and of human 
relations, he spends a large portion of his time with his superiors try­
ing to interpret and clarify the firm's objectives. He is typically 
upward oriented in contrast to the downward orientation of the first- 
level supervisor.
The first-level supervisor is a man whose successful achievement 
depends upon human relations skills and technical knowledge of the work 
that his subordinates perform. He shows much concern for his employees 
and their welfare and most of his time is spent with them. However, in 
order to be able to maintain their respect and allegiance, he must have 
upward influence which comes largely through proper attention to company 
goals.
A Systematically Developed Criterion 
of Managerial Success
One study was discovered in the literature which very systemat­
ically and objectively evaluated the requirements of managerial position 
as well as delineating the difference between upper- and lower-level man­
agement. The technique used is the same one which is being explored as 
a device for defining business game behavior in the empirical portion of 
this paper. John Flanagan performed an extensive study of Army officers' 
activities, asking the men interviewed to report incidents that they had 
observed in which what was done was especially effective or ineffective. 
The following incident will help clarify Flanagan's method:
This officer was an adjutant in my squadron. My former adjutant 
was very energetic and handled most of the administrative functions 
with little or no supervision. This new officer started out and was
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given the same authority as my former one. The administration began 
to slow down, reports were going in late, so I began to check. I 
found that this officer was very thorough, so thorough that even the 
most ordinary function was slowed down waiting for his signature.
One afternoon I heard the enlisted men talking. The conversation 
was to the effect that they were through work at noon and here it 
was 3 p.m. and the passes were not signed yet. I checked with the 
adjutant and found that he was too busy at noon but would get to it 
as soon as he finished a roster he was making up. I picked up thg 
passes, signed them, and got the men started on their way. I checked 
with some of the men in the unit and found that this delay had be­
come a common occurrence. I then decided that this man was too slow
for my unit and got rid of him on the next shipment.18
This incident demonstrating ineffective behavior is typical of 
the 3,000 descriptions of outstanding and unsatisfactory job performance 
used by the researcher to develop a Check List of Critical Requirements 
for Officer Evaluation. From these incidents, Flanagan derived fifty-
four critical requirements, in turn organized into six major skills 
categories. Flanagan's categories are shown below in digested form, with 
only the critical requirements for category IV shown for purposes of il­
lustration :
Relative frequency in per cents of incidents reported for each 
item on the Check List of Critical Requirements for Officer Evalua­
tion, comparing incidents reported concerning Colonels and Generals 
with those reported for all officers.
Per Cent for Per Cent for
All Officers Col. and Gen.
Item (N = 2,907) (N = 412)
I. Proficiency in Handling Administrative
Details 6.9 3.6
II. Proficiency in Supervising Personnel 13.6 29.6
III. Proficiency in Planning and Directing
Action 16.8 39.8
IV. Acceptance of Organizational Respon­
sibility 13.0 9.2
^^John C . Flanagan, "Defining the Requirements of the Executive's 
Job," Personnel. XXVIII (July, 1951), p. 29.
19lbid., p. 34.
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Per Cent for Per Cent for
All Officers Col. and Gen.
Item (N = 2,907) (N = 412)
34. Complying with Orders and Directives 1.8 0.0
35. Accepting Organizational Procedure 2.7 0.7
36. Subordinating Personal Interests 4.2 3.4
37. Cooperating with Associates 1.6 1.7
38. Showing Loyalty 1.9 1.2
39. Taking Responsibility 0.9 2.2
Acceptance of Personal Responsibility 
Proficiency in Military Occupational
35.3 11.7
Specialty 14.4 6.1
Note that the Colonel and General column (right column) shows 
the proportions of certain incident categories concerning Colonels and 
Generals only, while the left column contains the percent of all inci­
dents classified under a certain category. The Colonel and General
classification is probably a well-defined military counterpart to the 
civilian definition of top management. In like manner, other officers 
would be considered parallel to middle management while noncommissioned 
officers would, in most cases, be the equivalent of first-level super­
vision.
If these analogies hold true, some interesting distinctions can 
be made between middle and upper management on the basis of Flanagan's 
study. As was pointed out in the quotations from Barnard and the Foun­
dation for Research in Human Behavior study, the critical requirements 
for upper-level management are found chiefly in the decision-making area, 
"Proficiency in Planning and Directing Action." The specific require­
ments that showed the most frequent occurrence of incidents in this 
category were "Solving Problems," "Making Use of Experience," "Long- 
Range Planning," and "Making Correct Decisions." The only finding that 
is surprising for the Colonels and Officers is the heavy emphasis on the
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Supervisory category. This is probably a military bias elicited by the 
vast numbers of men in an organization such as the United States Army 
and by the special purpose that such an organization performs.
In the left column, which is heavily weighted with middle manage­
ment counterparts, there is much less of a pattern of emphasis— incidents 
being scattered throughout critical requirements on a rather even dis­
tribution, probably due to the vast number of positions and activities 
surveyed (2,907 officers). However, it is not surprising that the heav­
iest category weighting is in "Acceptance of Personal Responsibility." 
This category seems to contain incidents related to the interpolative 
function of middle management including such requirements as "Being Fair 
and Scrupulous" and 'Adapting to the Job." Again, this category probably 
includes a military bias on the part of the senior officers for conform­
ity and obedience on the part of lower-level officers.
A Single Criterion of Success in Management 
For the purposes of this thesis one complete and comprehensive 
set of criteria of managerial success is needed. In reviewing the mate­
rial in this chapter, it would appear that the best defined standards—  
both from the standpoint of empirical research and from an intuitive 
view— would be the Seven Expressions of Executive Effectiveness defined 
by the Educational Testing Service listed and clarified earlier. These 
expressions define "what kind of men we are looking for" in observable 
behavioral terms that are goal directed.
In Table 1, page 24, these seven expressions are listed in Column 
(3). To the right, in Column (4) a graphical position profile is drawn
TABLE 1
A COMPARISON OF GOALS, POSITION RESPONSIBILITIES, AND EXPRESSIONS 
OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THREE STUDIES WITH A SUGGESTED 
POSITION PROFILE FOR A TOP EXECUTIVE
General Electric’s 
Departmental Goals
(1)
The Executive Study 
Position Profile
(2)
Educational Testing Service 
Expressions of Executive
Effectiveness
(3)
Graphic Position Profile
(4)
Average
Profitability 
Market Position 
Technological 
Leadership
Business Reputation 
Technical Aspects 
of Products and 
Markets
1. His organization pro­
duces profits.
Productivity Business Control 2. He operates efficiently.
to
Employee
Attitudes
Personal demands 
Supervision of work 3. He develops high morale.
Personnel
Development Supervision of work
4. He develops the compe­
tence of subordinates.
Balance between 
short-run and 
long-run plan­
ning
Exercise of broad 
power or author­
ity
Preservation of 
assets
He makes realistic plans 
for the future.
Employee Attitudes
Providing a staff 
service in non- 
operational areas
He maintains a good rela­
tionship with others in 
the organization.
Public
responsibility
Human community and 
social affairs
7. He fosters good public
relations.
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representing a hypothetical position very near the top rungs of an or­
ganization. Many activities of this executive are immediately translated 
into the goals achievement of the organization. He has little production 
responsibility other than choosing men to fill prominent roles in this 
function. A moderate amount of his time is spent in supervision. His 
major activities are those of planning and fostering good public rela­
tions .
In Column (2) are listed the various position responsibilities 
that correspond to the performance statements in Column (3). For pur­
poses of illustration the position responsibilities developed by the 
Executive Study are used. Finally, in Column (1), the departmental goals 
defined by General Electric are listed. These are aligned with the pos­
ition descriptions that are likely necessary to fulfill them in Column 
(2) and the effective performance statements that demonstrate what their 
fulfillment looks like in action in Column (3).
In actual practice, as a means of establishing the criteria to 
be used in developing a business game to measure managerial performance, 
the following procedure might be followed:
1. The goals of the organization for which a man was being eval­
uated would be defined as shown in Column (1) of Table 1,
2. The responsibilities necessary for achieving these goals 
would be translated into a position profile as shown in Column (2) of 
Table 1.
3. These responsibilities statements would be categorized into 
more specific statements such as the Seven Expressions of Executive
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Effectiveness as shown in Column (3) of Table 1. A graphic profile 
could be developed as shown in Column (4) of Table 1.
4. Behavioral statements of job activities would be developed 
that could be related to the fulfillment of the responsibilities and 
goals.
5. A game would be designed that elicited behavior identical or 
similar to that described in Step 4 above.
Since an empirical study such as the one suggested above is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, the Seven Expressions of Executive Effectiveness 
will serve as criteria against which game behavior, to be discussed later 
in this paper, will be evaluated.
Summary
The following conclusions seem applicable to the development of 
criteria of managerial effectiveness useful for designing business games 
to predict success:
Managerial behavior must be capable of being observed and eval­
uated as oriented toward company goals in order to be judged effective. 
These goals in turn depend upon industrial characteristics, conditions in 
the economy and other influences that are likely to change over time. The 
determination of what is effective behavior depends not only on the spe­
cific goals and function of the organization, but also on the position of 
the manager in terms of his level of the hierarchy, and the functions of 
business performed.
The most promising study discovered in the literature for object­
ively and systematically determining a criterion of success for management
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is Flanagan's critical requirements study. In this study no intuitive 
standards are predetermined. All requirements and categories are de­
rived objectively from observed behavior by interviews with peers and 
supervisors.
A broad set of criteria have been empirically determined for 
effective managerial performance by the Educational Testing Service 
entitled "Seven Expressions of Executive Effectiveness." These have 
been selected as the best existing criteria of typical effective man­
agerial performance for the study at hand. A job profile chart could 
be developed utilizing these Seven Expressions of Effectiveness with 
a variation in degree for each area as the beginning step in the de­
sign of a simulation exercise to predict managerial success. Such a 
chart would be similar to the one in Column (4) of Table 1, drawn for 
a hypothetical job near the top levels of a business organization.
In Chapter III the literature on business gaming will be reviewed 
to determine what kind of managerial activities have been elicited by 
games and how game environments might be controlled for predictive pur­
poses .
CHAPTER III 
CONTROL OVER GAME DEVELOPMENT
In Chapter II the question of "what kind of men are we looking 
for" was explored. In this chapter the literature on business gaming 
will be explored to determine whether or not realistic managerial behav­
ior has been observed in business game operations. The primary focal 
point of this review will be on games to determine what kind of manage­
rial activities have been elicited and how these activities might be 
controlled in games used for predictive purposes.
The behavior elicited in games, as well as the learning that is 
expected to be derived from game experiences, depends to a great extent 
on the kind of game played. In a classic work on gaming, Greenlaw, et al. 
developed two subgroupings for distinguishing game orientation: (1) gen­
eralized versus specific industry games, and (2) total enterprise versus 
functional games.^ The generalized industry game is the one most fre­
quently considered in the literature and is descriptive of such games and 
the AMA Top Management Decision Simulation, the IBM Top Management Game, 
and the UCLA Series of Executive Games. Other games simulated specific
management activities such as the operation of service stations, super-
2
markets, or firms in the detergent industry. These latter types of games
Ipaul S. Greenlaw, Lowell W. Herron, and Richard H. Rawdon, Busi­
ness Simulation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962,
p. 16.
^Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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were designed primarily for special training jobs and it would seem that 
their ability to predict managerial success might be greater for manage­
rial candidates within their own industries. The AMA, IBM, and UCLA 
games are all of the generalized industry type. Decisions are broadly 
defined (one decision covering all of the research and development area) 
and are generally required in most of the policy-level areas of business 
operation.
The functional games require a more concentrated attention to one 
area of business, such as marketing or production, and can be telescoped 
down to concentrate on a specific problem such as production scheduling or 
machine loading. Most of the problem-type functional games have optimum 
solutions, a feature which is not typical of the top-management games.
The Industry Simulated 
It is a generally accepted principle that the goals of an organiza­
tion affect the requirements for effective managerial behavior. One of 
the chief determinants of these goals and objectives is the industry char­
acteristics within which a firm competes. A rather extensive study of the 
effects of industry characteristics on behavior of businessmen was performed 
by Symonds, utilizing a business simulation. He varied such parameters 
as credit, labor loyalty, supply elasticity, technological factors, methods 
of evaluation of physical assets, and tax and monopoly regulations. Game 
play with easy credit and an absence of labor loyalty produced alternating 
periods of raging inflation and depression. When hypothetical businessmen
3Ibid., pp. 17-19.
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were given a chance to regulate themselves they did so readily— stabi­
lizing the market.^
One way in which industry characteristics might be incorporated 
into games would be through the use of what Cohen and Rhenman call the 
"business game case." Although most business games have provided that 
all the rules of the game be specified at the beginning and that most de­
cisions be programmed for computer scoring, neither of these requirements 
is made in the business game case. For example, instead of financing in 
a game being limited to two or three rigid alternatives, all of the lines 
of credit normally open to firms in a particular industry would be made 
available. Representatives of banks or brokerage firms would judge the 
teams' skills at presenting a proposal. Cohen and Rhenman suggest the 
addition of other dynamic case material such as bad press releases neces-
A a
sitating a well-planned public relations function.
Functional Simulation 
One of the skills necessary for effective managerial performance 
at lower levels of the management hierarchy is the ability to operate with 
special methods and techniques in a functional area. In 1964 a survey of 
the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business disclosed the 
use of eighteen functional games, including the simulation of such diverse 
functions as collective bargaining, inventory control, stock market in­
vestment, insurance underwriting management, purchasing, and retailing.
^Gifford H. Symonds, "A Study of Management Behavior by Use of 
Competitive Business Games," Management Science, II, No. 1 (September, 
1964), p. 146.
^Kalman J. Cohen and Eric Rhenman, "The Role of Management Games 
in Education and Research," in Executive Readings in Management Science, 
ed., Kenneth Starr Martin (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), pp.
353-356.
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Obviously, functionalizatlon of games tends to lower the simula­
tion in the management hierarchy. In the description of a production 
exercise, Bellas, et al. provides the rationale for this type of simula­
tion:
It appears that in an attempt to stimulate employee interest or 
train managers, the games are subjecting the participants to decisions 
that they may never make, and which in fact the officers of the com­
pany may never get the opportunity to make. . . . Realistically, 
these lower-level managers rarely are in a position to know of or 
even be concerned with the problems and decisions associated with 
overall company operations, sales, and profits.^
In the production exercise being examined, ” . . .  quasi-realis- 
tic exogenous events such as machine breakdowns and workers' absenteeism 
. . . (are) . . . randomly introduced into the system to evaluate the 
player's response to each event as he attempts to manage the operation of 
his specific functional area."^ The participant becomes a hypothetical 
production supervisor, responsible for producing and assembling a sub- 
assembly for an end product, supervising ten to fifteen workers.^
One functional game for retailing offers concentrated attention 
to consumer behavior and the demand elasticity variable.® In a game for 
an introductory course in accounting, students are required to develop 
their own forms for cash budgets, statements of cost of goods sold, income
^Carl J. Bellas, et al., "A New Approach to Production Management 
Training," MSU Business Topics, XVII, No. 2 (Spring, 1969), p. 58.
Gibid.
?Ibid.
^Robert E. Schellenberger, "A Computerized, Multipurpose Manage­
ment Game Applied to Retailing," Journal of Retailing, XLI (Winter, 1965- 
1966), pp. 10-20.
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statements and statements of financial position.^ It appears that by 
use of imagination and some effort many functions of business can be sim­
ulated in some depth.
Total Enterprise Simulation
Dill bemoans the use of the ten-or-twelve decision top-management 
games that require fast moves and lack complexity by suggesting that they
'stimulate" but do not "simulate." He suggests that:
A game that aims to give a man the experience of being a manager
is one that is designed to develop the following:
The ability to recognize new situations. . . .
The ability to set goals. . . .
. . .  A willingness to define what he really needs and to go out
and find it.
An understanding of the relationships among specialized activities 
within a firm. . . .
A willingness to assume effective responsibility— whether as 
"chief" or as "Indian". . . .
An ability to assess and classify experience, to delegate work 
to subordinates, or pass it on to a successor in ways that will keep 
the organization headed toward its goals.^0
Dill suggests that these qualifications call for a rather complex 
game, which provides a great deal of feedback information, that requires 
specialization of team members and coordinated teamwork, and that re­
quires teams to pay for information and make their own discoveries of what 
information is available to them. Furthermore, teams need to have the 
flexibility of determining what decisions need to be made and for
9jack Gray, John Willingham, and Kenneth Johnston, "A Business 
Game for an Introductory Course in Accounting," Accounting Review, XXXVIII, 
No. 2 (April, 1963), pp. 336-346.
l^William R. Dill, "iVhat Management Games Do Best," Business 
Horizons, IV, No. 3 (Fall, 1961), p. 57.
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establishing policies and rules that will guide many routine decisions.
He captions the above considerations the Decision-Making aspects of games.
Another dimension of games which this same author explores is 
one which he entitled the Environment created by games. The greatest 
weakness cited for the relatively "simple" game is the lack of live in­
teraction among persons at different levels within teams. Administrators 
of the Carnegie game have attempted to overcome this shortcoming by re­
quiring that their team managers formulate policy guidelines which lower 
level students (subordinates) in turn use to make decisions. If the 
policies are poorly defined or if the subordinates fail to carry them out 
successfully the managers must live with the results. Other interactive 
variables that have been added include the negotiation of a loan with 
actual bankers and confrontation of the managers with labor union de­
mands.
In summary Dill says that in order to create an interactive en­
vironment and realistic game dimensions in decision-making areas, one 
must combine a simple total enterprise game with several different func­
tional games (using the definitions of Greenlaw, et al.).
Drawing largely from the managerial experiences defined by Dill, 
an attempt will be made at this time to discover accounts in the 
literature of business simulations which have met his requirements as 
well as other game characteristics that seem worth exploring.
^^Ibid., pp. 58-59.
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Problem-Recognition and Problem-Solving 
Amstutz believes that "the implicit objective of all business is 
to teach problem-solving, . . . "  but that games had been quite unsuccess­
ful in doing this at the time of his writings in 1963.^^ Furthermore, 
he says that if learning occurs at all in a game it must " . . .  occur 
during input preparation when the players analyze the problems facing 
them by developing and testing models of the game environment, thereby 
determining which of many courses of action are appropriate, which deci­
sion variables are relevant, and what information is needed. Learning 
may also occur when reports are received from the game environment; at 
this point players may learn to selectively analyze information, apply 
basic tools of quantitative analysis, and verify or reject previously 
developed models of the game environment."^^ For the purposes of this 
discussion it seems likely that these statements about learning, if cor­
rect, could also be applied in part to managerial problem-recognition 
and problem-solving since these activities include forms of learning.
The major weaknesses of games upon which Amstutz builds his crit­
icisms are the aggregation of variables such as advertising, research, 
and capital investment decisions and the very short turn-around time so 
popular in the early years of game play.
Following the thoughts of Amstutz, the unrealistic aggregating 
problem mentioned above can be alleviated by replacing purely quantita­
tive decisions with qualitative inputs. For example, the aggregate
l^Arnold E. Amstutz, "Management Games— A Potential Perverted," 
Industrial Management Review, V, No. 1 (Fall, 1963), p. 31.
l^ibid., p. 30.
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advertising expenditure could be replaced with a requirement for specific 
media schedules. But since advertising schedules and campaigns can sel­
dom be evaluated by the computer a human interface should be inserted 
between the players and the computer. This interface would consist of 
persons who would " . . .  endeavor to simulate the responses of consumers, 
salesmen, retailers, distributors, and other appropriate individuals to 
qualitative inputs from the players." It is obvious that these human 
interfaces enrich the environment created for problem-recognition and 
problem-solving in a quantitative manner. They allow students " . . .  to 
interrogate the game population in an effort to estimate their responses 
to . . ." various inputs."^
Both writers, Dill and Amstutz, caution that we may have to sac­
rifice some of the stimulation of aggregate variable games for the "sim­
ulation" that can be provided by complex games requiring not only many 
more decisions (the Carnegie Tech Game can generate up to two hundred 
individual decisions per move) but more qualitative enrichment as well.
In a systematic study of learning in the Carnegie Tech Game, Dill 
and Doppelt found that two-thirds of the learning in their game consisted 
of " . . . new recognition that certain problems exist for managers.
Of the learning that took place, 31 per cent consisted of the development 
of specific solutions or strategies. These authors suggest that the
ISibid.
^^William R. Dill and Neil Doppelt, "The Acquisition of Experience 
in a Complex Management Game," Management Science, X, No. 1 (October, 
1963), p. 35.
17%bid.
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preoccupation with problem-recognition can be alleviated by adding reflec­
tive off-line case study and problem type assignments, extending game 
experience.
Goal Setting
Another unrealistic aspect of the aggregate variable game is the 
inability to allow for the establishment of policy decisions or broad 
objectives, without altering them drastically each time short-run adjust­
ments need to be made. King, et al. believe that they have found the 
answer to this problem in the MIT Marketing Game:
The M.I.T. game is designed to operate both strategically and 
tactically. . . .  We have asked the students to develop strategic 
plans on an annual basis, including a detailed statement of relation­
ships with resellers, a choice of product characteristics and image, 
and a specification of advertising themes and media to support this 
image. . . .  We require that these broad categories be held constant 
for a year of game play, but allow tactical variation involving 
changes in the amount of advertising expenditure and in price on a 
quarterly basis.
As mentioned before, the Carnegie Tech Game allows managers to 
turn in broad decision rules for three months at a time. Subordinates 
then make month-to-month decisions guided by these rules. There is no 
intervening contact with subordinates during the three moves and poorly 
defined policies usually elicit poor results.
^^Peter S. King, et al., "The M.I.T. Marketing Game," in Market­
ing: A Maturing Discipline: Proceedings of the Eighth Conference, ed.,
Martin L. Bell (New York: American Marketing Association, December,
1960), p. 90.
^^Dill, "Management Games," p. 58.
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Understanding Integrated Relationships 
The need for this managerial attribute is emphasized in a dramat­
ic way by the experience of one professor who visited with a company 
executive who had recently allowed his people to play the Purdue Farm 
Supply Management Game. While unaware of the professor's co-authorship 
of the game, the executive expressed surprised satisfaction that the 
people in his sales management and production management departments had
developed an understanding of each other's problems while playing the 
20game.^u
Business game teams apparently find the simultaneous considera­
tion of several major variables a difficult process as, indeed, it tends
to be in actual business operation, Babb and Eisgruber found chat teams
without prior preparation tended to jump around from one aspect of the
business to another on a random basis. When specific delegation of
21assignments were made, their performance improved considerably.
Assumption of Responsibility 
Babb and Eisgruber analyzed numerous game plays incorporating 
participants from a number of similar operating firms. They discovered 
that teams which did not have their president or general manager present 
often ranked at the bottom of the thirteen participating teams and never 
ranked in the top three positions. "This suggests that these men really 
are key to the decision process and considerable reliance is put in their
O A
E. M. Babb and L. M. Eisgruber, Management Games for Teaching 
and Research (Chicago: Educational Methods, Inc., 1966), p. 26,
Zllbid., p. 137.
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manager or president for direction and control." These researchers 
found from tape recordings that teams without these predetermined leaders 
had more trouble getting organized, setting goals, and resolving con­
flicts. The conflict resolution problem was especially typical of teams
with well-trained and aggressive individuals because of their reluctance
23to yield to others of equal rank. This points to a possible problem 
in using games to predict managerial behavior. Some system may need to 
be devised to insure a reasonable balance in terms of the temperament 
and abilities of participants on any one team. Clearly, the success of 
a man in terms of any standard criteria will depend to some degree on the 
personality of the persons with whom he is matched. Perhaps a man needs 
to be rotated from team to team in order to insure a good representation 
of his total behavior reaction pattern.
There are certain types of responsibilities that, while onerous 
and tiresome, are very necessary in the business world. Creative and 
ambitious students often assume that an idea, once evolved, will auto­
matically work without the attention to detail and "follow-through" 
required in i n d u s t r y . B u t  business simulations can have more or less 
of a requirement for the assumption of this responsibility on the part 
of game managers. Many of the less complex, general management games in­
corporated what Cohen, et al. calls " . . .  the ’Mikado* approach, which 
assumes that somehow, someone, in some unspecified way, always orders
22%bid., p. 138.
Z^ibid.
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Kalman J. Cohen, et al., The Carnegie Tech Management Game 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964), p. 104.
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exactly what is necessary, so that the players only have to specify the 
amount of total output they want without bothering or even knowing about 
raw materials." These authors caution that, "The real world, alas, is 
not like the Japan of Gilbert and Sullivan, where, when the Mikado says, 
'Let a thing be done,' it's as good as done."25 a. realistic simulation 
of management calls for responsible implementation of procedures correctly 
and on time.
Cohen, et al. suggest two alternative solutions for the proper 
simulation of this function. One is to assume nothing, but to require 
players to request materials or other implementation by inserting figures 
and amount. Another " . . .  built-in organization approach is to assume 
that there is a raw materials manager in the plant and that he follows 
certain specified policies and decision rules in ordering materials.
A game programmed in this manner would also allow for enrichment of the 
"delegation" and "assessment and clarification" functions discussed in 
this chapter. Game managers could vary their behavior from that of tak­
ing " . . .  no specific action at all in respect to raw materials . . . "  
concentrating on other more important aspects of the business, to that 
of completely suspending the built-in rules during unexpected events.
Assessment and Clarification of Experience 
Most game environments are complex enough to provide enough data 
and feedback so that participants who do not classify it and treat it in
Z^Kalman J. Cohen and Merton H. Miller, "Management Games, Infor­
mation Processing, and Control," Management International, III/IV, No. 3 
(April, 1964), pp. 159-161.
^^Ibid., p. 166. 27%bid., pp. 166-167.
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some systematic fashion become confused and bewildered. In on-going 
business firms standard operating procedures and standard reports and 
charts have become so commonplace to the employees that they are usually 
called by some short, informal nickname rather than the formal title 
assigned to them. In game operations these procedures are seldom as­
signed, and game play is chaotic until they are designed and mastered.
In almost any investigation of peer evaluations of teammates, the man who 
performs well in classifying numerical data or charting information is 
considered very valuable to the rest of the team.
There are, however, a number of reasons why the total game expe­
rience provided for assessing and clarifying data might not be of the 
level of the gamester's counterpart in business. First, as was mentioned 
earlier, the game itself may not be complex enough. One author gives the 
following account by "an intelligent management-oriented individual . . . 
making decisions in a simple game environment":
We had lost volume. We had lost share of market. We had reduced
inventory. Our profits were cut in half. There was only one possible
conclusion. Our price had been the same. Our R and D three quarters 
before had been high. Only our advertising had been cut. This, we 
figured, was the reason for our shellacking.^8
The author acknowledges that this participant's reasoning might 
be correct but he concludes that " . . .  a game which induces this type 
of behavior is doing nothing to teach managers problem-solving in an 
orderly and research-based, analytical way. Problem-solving in the real 
world seldom reduces to the simple case of varying one aggregate parameter
28Amstutz, "Management Games," p. 32.
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and viewing the implications of this variation in a second directly ob­
servable factor."29
At Carnegie Tech the environment for a challenging assessment and 
clarification experience is provided by a complex game and by the arrange­
ment that each team work with a board of directors. The board of directors 
is comprised of faculty members and off-campus businessmen who require 
their teams to defend their goals, forecasting procedures, and plans on a 
periodic basis. This insures that teams will devote some time to thinking 
through their activities as they attempt to present their viewpoints in a 
systematic fashion. The board requires periodic reports and presentations
and occasionally prods team members who are procrastinating on important
. . 30Gecisions.
Many games on the market today have built-in market research in­
formation which can be purchased by participants. If the range of possible 
purchases is great enough and the prices of research are varied, this 
provides team managers with a more scientific outlet for the assessment 
and clarification of data. Presumably the research descriptions are so 
written that one must gain a basic knowledge of research techniques and 
systemize his thinking in order to choose the proper combination of re­
search purchases. A more realistic simulation would allow teams to 
purchase a special study by the computer of almost any type of data which 
they could define and which they could afford.
29ibid.
20cohen, et al., Carnegie Management Game, pp. 79-85, 
21Cohen and Miller, "Management Games," p. 166.
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Delegation of Work to Subordinates 
Since delegation is part of the leadership function, this discus­
sion will cover the two functions jointly. Games have not simulated this 
skill in a very structured way, although the environment for it obviously 
exists in any game played by more than one participant. The chief defi­
ciency has been the absence of a structured hierarchy, with most teams 
choosing to be rather democratic in their decision-making. Furthermore, 
the few participants per team has precluded the use of more than one man­
agerial level in most instances.
A few games, notably the Carnegie Tech game, require the use of 
subordinates who report formally to an upper-level manager. Reaction
toward unsatisfactory management styles in games tends to be frank and 
32
open. In the AMA General Management Simulation a multilevel hierarchy 
is maintained in several functional areas. Different types of data are 
fed back in accordance with a man's position on the team. Interpersonal 
and intergroup action is measured during these decision periods and a rat­
ing is quantified for the computer by the use of rating scales.
The Organizational Climate Simulated 
Since the major purpose of most business simulations is to dupli­
cate hypothetical business operations, it seems obvious that the 
organizational environment created should be an important consideration. 
Perhaps the acid test of authentic organizational simulation could be
32Cohen, et al., Carnegie Management Game, p. 105.
^^Greenlaw, Herron, and Rawdon, Business Simulation, p. 56.
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found in the attempts to use business games for laboratories in organiza­
tion research. Again, the major criticism leveled against this approach 
is that the games lack realism and complexity.
Paradoxically, Bernard Bass thinks that business games may be too 
complex for many types of research. He substantiates his thoughts in a 
perceptive fashion:
The typical game is not the tool to test specific cognitive pro­
cesses, one-by-one, any more than a pilot plant is usually necessary 
to test a specific chemical reaction, or a windtunnel is necessary to 
test the tensile strength of a particular alloy. It is when we no 
longer trust the test tube findings of several interrelated processes 
or the simple stress tests of the alloy, that we build the pilot plant 
or we put the alloy into a specific wing structure to try a "property- 
rich" simulation. Thus, we argue that the game becomes the recom­
mended experimental procedure when we want to examine questions about 
the organizational mix, particularly of real men, processes and mater­
ials as they interact. When no simple experiment with all but one 
variable held constant will provide the answers we seek, it will be 
profitable to simulate the organization.34
Bass proceeded to develop an organizational simulation that he 
felt possessed research potential. First, he added a labor force of sub­
ordinates, which required internal attention so that cooperation would be 
elicited and tested. Next, in order to simulate the environment of a 
large organization, he arbitrarily increased communication difficulties. 
This he did by prohibiting face-to-face communications at any one time by 
more than one-third of the members of the operating organization. Com­
panies were required to organize themselves to produce and market tangible 
products (IBM cards cut into specific lengths, assembled and fastened with 
staplers and tape). To continue realism in interpersonal relations a
^^Bernard M. Bass, "Business Gaming for Organizational Research," 
Management Science, X, No. 3 (April, 1964), pp. 546-547.
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"diagonal slice" of representatives of management personnel were recruited 
from a single company and assigned jobs similar to their own in real life. 
Managers were assigned salaries based on operating c o s t s . ^5
Some of the resulting activities are descriptive of the kinds of 
organization realism which can be developed. Companies with more formal 
hierarchies and in which most scheduling and creative thinking was done by 
management tended to leave plant employees rather idle. They used this 
free time in a number of cases to form unions. In some cases management 
was able to foil union organization by promoting union agitators.
Another unique dimension of the Bass game is the ability of work­
ers to quit one firm and accept employment with another. Pirating of 
managers or workers can lead to a firm cornering the labor market.
Bass thinks that the lack of perfect reproduction of the real 
world may be advantageous in simulation. For example, in his game exper­
iment, management was at one time considering laying off several workers, 
but they hesitated thinking that all workers might go on a strike in spite 
of the illogic of their actions. He explained why management was probably 
correct. "What we have here in miniature is a collapsing of time coupled 
with potential over excitation of behavior illustrative of what might 
occur in much less dramatic form or actually only be felt, but not acted 
out in real life industry."3?
One other way to examine the importance of an organizational en­
vironment in simulating realistic business or in eliciting managerial
35ibid., p. 548. 36lbid., p. 553.
^^Ibid., p. 554.
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behavior is to examine the things that student game participants consid­
ered most important and which stood out in their memory. A study by Dill 
and Doppelt showed that far more learning occurs from interpersonal exper­
iences than from analytic tasks. Students tended to comment about 
organizational learning in terms of coordination of activities, the pres­
sures of decision deadlines, justification of activities to the Board, 
establishment of routines, and the importance of influence patterns. In 
fact, 76 per cent of the learning that took place was team-derived, as
no
compared to external or model-derived learning.
These organizational characteristics of games are very important 
if we plan to use them as an environment for measuring or predicting suc­
cessful performance. As early as 1958, Harold Leavitt explained why this 
is so:
It is not usually true that people simply succeed or fail. They 
succeed or fail "if," or they would have succeeded or failed "but." 
They might have succeeded if they had worked for another kind of 
superior; or if management had given them a little looser 
or a little tighter rein, or if they had been provided with a high- 
powered assistant; or if the job description had been rewritten so 
that the new man was given more responsibility in Area A and less 
in Area B. For success on a job, especially a decision-making manage­
rial job, is not a function of personality alone but of a personality 
in an environment. Any testing procedure that tends to describe the 
complications of a personality, rather than to simplify it, provides 
extra data for relating the person to the environment. If the person 
is relatively unmodifiable, perhaps the environment is not.39
This is a rather bold statement on Leavitt's part, since few "or­
ganizational men" would accept the fact that a subordinate's failure
^®Dill and Doppelt, "Acquisition of Experience," p. 37.
^^Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (Chicago; The Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 111.
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might be due to anything other than his own weaknesses. A few years after 
the above statement, however, Leavitt supports his thesis with a number of 
important research disclosures of himself and his colleagues. In one of 
these involving the Carnegie Tech Game play, it was " . . .  found that 
those teams had the highest morale and also performed best in which there 
was the greatest differentiation of influence among team members. That is, 
teams whose players saw themselves as all about equally influential were 
less satisfied and made smaller profits than teams whose players agreed 
that some particular individuals were a good deal more influential than 
others.
In the process of his investigation, Leavitt challenges some 
rather cherished beliefs of management of the last thirty years. His chal­
lenges are very relevant to the assumption that we can develop a realistic 
simulation of the managerial environment. It should be noted that one of 
the most stimulating things about games has been the complete unfamiliar­
ity of participants with the game environment. But as Leavitt so well 
illustrates, the first thing that any human being does when given a prob­
lem to solve is develop a general system or a "program" for solving that 
class of problems. Once a general program is established that works rea­
sonably well the excitement subsides. Or, as Leavitt points out, "Once 
they have developed it, the players can very easily instruct other people, 
or machines, to play the game according to the system they have developed.
^^Harold J . Leavitt, "Unhuman Organizations," Harvard Business Re­
view, XL, No. 4 (July-August, 1962), p. 96.
41lbid., p. 93.
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(One group of students has actually programmed a computer to play a com­
plex game.)42
Next, Leavitt asks a perceptive question related to values of 
participative management which holds important implications for gaming.
He asks: "Is it reasonable to think that we can in the real world main­
tain a continuously challenging 'unprogrammed' state for all members of 
an organization? . . . especially when members themselves are always 
searching for complete programs? . . . and while the demands made upon 
the organizations call for routine tasks like making the same part tomor­
row, tomorrow, and tomorrow that was made today?"^^
Applying these thoughts to games, one might conclude that we are 
creating one type of environment in games when the rules and problems are 
fresh and unfamiliar and quite a different one once game play has stabi­
lized and general solutions have been developed. Perhaps the kind of 
managerial behavior that games evoke, challenge, or predict success in, 
depends upon the stage of the game play. Indeed, this conclusion seems 
to be implied by a report of game play by Dill and Doppelt in which they 
found teams focusing successively on three areas of activity. The initial 
focus was on problems of organization, the second on maintaining the firm 
as an operating entity, and the third in challenges of experimentation and 
innovation. However, the author's qualification to this last stage is 
the important point. "Once a team has organized and stabilized its
Haines, F. Heider, and D. Remington, "The Computer as a 
Small Group Number," Administrative Science Quarterly, VI, No. 3 (December,
1961), p. 362.
^^Leavitt, "Unhuman Organizations," p. 93.
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competitive position, if it does not lose interest in the game, its major 
challenges lie in seeking ways to enliven play for themselves and compet­
itors and in exploring alternative strategies that it could not afford to 
try when it was trying first to understand and control its environment."^^
It may very well be that this last and often least exciting phase 
of gaming is the one most typical of going organizations. Furthermore, it 
seems likely that what is considered to be a true simulation of business 
operation, and hence a true test, or learning situation for managers, may 
depend as much on the goals established as on the type or complexity of 
activities.
Next the question might be asked, "Should different simulations be 
used Co predict success for different types of firms and levels of manage­
ment?" Turning over again the question of participation versus structured 
planning, Leavitt says:
Or shall we (and I favor this conclusion) pragmatically conclude 
that if we want to achieve one kind of goal, then one kind of struc­
ture seems feasible? If we want other criteria to govern, then 
another structure may make sense. Certainly it is reasonable to 
guess that in the real (as distinct from the laboratory) world, there 
will be locations and times which might make one set of criteria more 
important than the other even within the same large organization.45
From the above discussion it appears that the following tentative 
conclusions might be tendered. First, it appears that a realistic simula­
tion of the managerial environment may not only vary according to the goals 
of the organization (or suborganization) but also according to the level 
of the hierarchy being simulated. Furthermore, for predictive purposes.
^^Dill and Doppelt, "Acquisitions of Experience," p. 39. 
^^Leavitt, "Unhuman Organizations," p. 95.
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it appears that the success of any Individual in a managerial game may de­
pend not only upon his abilities and personality, but also upon the 
abilities and personalities of his teammates, upon the stated goals and 
criteria for effectiveness, and upon the level of the hierarchy being 
simulated. These suspicions (and perhaps they are nothing more than that 
at this time) point toward the need for a very clear delineation of the 
purpose and attributes of any particular game— not in terms of the simu­
lation intended but in terms of the simulation that occurs. Simply 
describing a game as a total enterprise game or as a functional game does 
not make the behavior that occurs top management or functional behavior. 
The activities and behaviors that each game elicits must be captured, de­
fined, and classified in some systematic fashion if they are to be used 
satisfactorily for prediction and evaluation of managerial candidates in 
industry.
A Synthesis of Control Measures for Game Environments
From this review of literature and the previous chapter on mana­
gerial behavior, it appears that any attempt to choose a simulation at 
random and to use it to predict on-the-job success for a participant 
would be questionable. The following characteristics should be carefully 
weighed and adjusted to a job profile similar to the one developed in 
Chapter II.
1. The Industry Simulated. There are advantages in providing a 
generalized industrial environment if one is evaluating experienced bus­
inessmen and wishes to look at their potential apart from past knowledge 
and experience in a particular industry. However, often times, industry
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characteristics so color the style of management necessary for success 
that it seems desirable to duplicate to a reasonable degree the industry 
for which an incumbent's success is being predicted.
One of the best innovations discovered for adding industry real­
ism to games is the addition of the dynamic business game case discussed 
in this chapter. " '
2. The Hierarchical Level Simulated. The important consideration 
here is not so much the quantitative model used as it is the actual men­
tal and behavioral processes that take place as decisions are being made. 
Managerial behavior elicited by the game must duplicate behavior for which 
one is predicting success. The important consideration is not what the 
game is designed to simulate— but what it actually simulates. Game be­
havior needs to be systematically captured and evaluated to determine 
what functions of management are being elicited by a game. These func­
tions should then be adjusted to bracket in a parallel fashion the 
position profile for which success is being predicted. A rather precise 
way of defining the level and character of work would be through in­
basket inputs to the game.
3. The Business Function Simulated. The degree to which empha­
sis is placed on one function of business should be determined by the 
managerial hierarchical level being considered. It is possible that one 
would want to predict success in a functional area, but would desire to 
base the success on managerial ability separate and apart from functional 
knowledge. This might be especially true if all contenders for a posi­
tion had proven themselves capable of performing well in the functional 
specialty at lower levels. On the other hand, realism and face validity
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of a predictor are likely to be increased by a functional enrichment and 
thus the acceptance of a candidate who performs well by other candidates 
will more likely be assured.
At the lower levels of the organization technical ability and 
functional knowledge are intricately interwoven with managerial ability. 
One way in which the function of business simulated could be controlled 
would be through the careful evaluation of inputs for a particular posi­
tion. Again, an in-basket interface might help in defining a functional 
position within a simulation model.
4. The Organizational Climate Simulated. There is a great danger 
that realism in games will be lost at this point due to the heavy empha­
sis on providing a stimulating and interesting exercise. Since most 
managerial jobs must develop into partial routines, and since participa­
tive management is limited in the actual business world, it is likely 
that a simulation for predictive purposes must be played until it repre­
sents a partially "programmed" state.
Organizational climate or philosophy is likely to be a most 
difficult variable to control. The establishment of a predetermined pol­
icy framework within which hypothetical managers must operate could offer 
some control here. For certain levels of management an organizational 
chart and job descriptions could be prescribed.
The design of a relevant game model for predictive or evaluative 
purposes is only useful if the behavior in such a game can be systematic­
ally described. In Chapter IV a theory is developed for describing the 
performance that occurs in business games.
CHAPTER IV
A THEORY FOR DESCRIBING MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 
IN A BUSINESS GAME
Attempts to Elicit and Describe Managerial 
Behavior In Simulations 
Most attempts to utilize games as controlled business environments 
have assumed that they elicit behavior that Is a duplication, or very 
similar to that, of an actual business organization, but there are no ac­
counts in the literature of attempts to test this hypothesis.
One of the primary thrusts of research in gaming has been in the 
area of testing and prediction of managerial performance. Here most ef­
forts could either be defined as the "shotgun approach" or as the "Iceberg 
approach." The "shotgun approach" Is typified by the Sears Roebuck and the 
Port of New York Authority experiments, where a variety of tests are ad­
ministered In a variety of situations. Including business games In the case 
of Sears Roebuck.^ The assumption seems to be that If enough test situa­
tions are created In which to observe a participant's behavior, and If the 
situations are varied enough, all of the managerial behavior critical to 
success In business will be elicited.
The "Iceberg approach" could be depicted by such studies as those
^Robert C. Albrook, "How to Spot Executives Early," Fortune, July, 
1968, pp. 106-111.
Felix M. Lopez, Jr., Evaluating Executive Decision Making: The
In-Basket Technique, American Management Association Research Study, No. 75 
(New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1966).
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of Teisch and VanSlyke.^ In these studies the environment of a dynamic 
interactive business game alone is considered rich enough to evoke all 
behavior critical to successful business performance. Therefore, success 
in the game is checked for validity by use of other tests and measures 
previously found to correlate significantly with success in management.
In other words, there is assumed to be an "iceberg " of behavior lurking 
beneath the surface of game activity, which although undescribable, engen­
ders similar behavior to that found in managerial jobs in industry.
This review of literature will first cover several research ac­
tivities that have attempted to measure the predictive power of business 
games. The purpose of each review will be (1) to show how this behavior 
has been described and evaluated in the individual study in question, and 
(2) to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Next, at­
tempts to develop evaluative and predictive instruments for managerial 
behavior in industry will be surveyed and the approach to be used in this
paper, the critical incident method, will be described.
The "Shotgun Approach"
In an article in Fortune in 1968, the attempts of several firms
to develop more sophisticated ways to predict future success of young po­
tential executives was described. The three U. S. enterprises being 
examined were Bell Telephone, Sears Roebuck and Company, and Humble Oil
^Howard Phillip Teisch, "The Validity of a Business Game," (un­
published Master's thesis. University of Oregon, 1964).
M. D. VanSlyke, "Psychological Correlates of Business Game Per­
formance and Managerial Success," (unpublished Master's thesis, Purdue 
University, 1964).
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and Refining Company. According to the article these firms were looking 
for an effective answer to the question of "how to find the talented man 
or woman" so that they could be started on the managerial path early.
While Humble utilizes a sophisticated biographical study. Bell and Sears 
prefer to base their forecasts on performance in management games. The 
author's comment on these techniques provides the rationale:
These techniques are powerful because they measure actual behavior 
in a standardized fashion. They do not depend upon a candidate's 
self-assessment as to whether, for example, he "likes people"— the 
approach often taken in ordinary interviewing or psychological test­
ing. Nor do they depend upon the sometimes suspect "reference from a 
friend, teacher, or former employer." Instead the biographical quiz 
reveals whether the candidate has, indeed, had a pattern of good per­
sonal relationships in his formative years. The games provide a live 
demonstration of such factors in a realistic setting.3
According to the writer the usefulness of these techniques is en­
hanced by the fact that only behavioral traits that have indicated success 
in the organizations described are utilized, " . . .  not some theoretical 
or idealized set of management virtues."^ It seems admirable that these 
companies are attempting to duplicate actual behavior patterns on the job; 
however, there seem to be a number of weaknesses inherent in this approach. 
First, there does not appear to be any systematic development of categories 
of performance (called "traits" by the above writer). Secondly, Hughes has 
pointed out that for the purposes of selection and evaluation, we may not 
be searching for all managerial behavior, but only behavior that is goal- 
oriented in terms of organizational objectives.^ It does appear that some
^Albrook, "Spot Executives Early," p. 106.
4lbid.
^Charles L. Hughes, "Assessing the Performance of Key Managers," 
Personnel, XLV (January-February, 1968), pp. 38-43.
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of the participating companies are eliciting realistic (and perhaps goal- 
oriented) behavior in their business simulations. In the management of a 
fictitious toy company pressures are put on participants by changes in 
prices or costs every twenty minutes:
Some candidates panic and disrupt the group with frequent and un­
helpful reminders of the deadline, some others lose their tempers, 
becoming hopelessly confused, or refuse to abandon absolute plans.
The visible contrasts sharpen between the steadier, more flexible, 
and even-tempered men and those who can't operate when pressured.°
While one might quarrel with the unrealistic practice in this game 
of beginning the teams without a leader and presuming that the man who 
"takes over" is a strong management contender— it seems that this might be 
a useful way to accelerate striving for hierarchical achievement.
After the candidates have gone home, Bell has assessors, who have 
not been assigned to each team, rate them on some twenty personal and be­
havioral characteristics, e.g., ability to plan, to use information 
effectively, and to exercise leadership.^ Again, the rationale of the 
study undertaken in this thesis becomes relevant. In the "shotgun ap­
proach" being used at Bell, it is assumed that assessors have had enough 
opportunity to observe performance so that a reasonable coverage of all 
critical behavioral patterns could be sampled. But apparently no system­
atic attempt has been made by any of these companies to develop a profile 
of behavioral patterns, either on the job or in gaming. Without a knowl­
edge of how well the universe of possible managerial behavior is being 
sampled, it seems impossible for one to determine whether or not assessors
^Albrook, "Spot Executives Early," p. 108. 
^Ibid.
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have an adequate basis on which to formulate judgments. In a more in­
volved discussion of the in-basket portion of A. T. and T.’s assessment 
program, Bray partially attacks this problem: "In my opinion, it is very
hazardous to make judgments about people without an opportunity to see 
them actually engaged in either real work situations or simulations, . . .
g
simulation should be as essential part of the selection process."
Perhaps one more attempt at describing what is meant by the
"shotgun approach" would be helpful at this stage of the discussion. The
remarks below are taken from Bray's description of the A. T. and T. Assess­
ment Program:
. . . we have a standard procedure in which we always interview 
Che man about his in-basket performance very soon after he takes 
it. . . . In the miniature business games, the only particular wrinkle 
we have is that we generally plunge the participants into the game 
without giving any opportunity to plan, and thereafter, the first pe­
riod of activity we give them a specific planning period. In the 
leaderless group discussion a group of six is involved. Each man is 
given a description of a fictitious subordinate that he is recommend­
ing for promotion. . . . The participant is told that he is to read 
up on his man for about five minutes and each one makes a five-minute
pitch for his candidate.^
Bray continues to explain that an overall judgment is finally ar­
rived at based on such characteristics as: oral communication skills,
leadership skills, social objectivity, behavior flexibility, primacy of 
work, tolerance of uncertainty, and decision-making. According to the 
author:
^Douglas W. Bray, "Situational Tests in Assessment of Managers, 
Part I, The Assessment Program," Management Games in Selection and Devel­
opment, Proceedings of the Executive Study Conference (Onchiota Conference 
Center, Tuxedo, New York: Executive Study Conference, May, 1964), p. 121.
9Ibid., pp. 122-123.
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There is no mechanical process for combining the ratings on the 
individual characteristics. It is obvious that they cannot be added 
up, divided by N, and an average rating reached because it is quite 
clear that some of these characteristics may be more important than
others.10
While it seems true that these characteristics could not be added 
up, it does seem possible that the observed incidents of behavior through 
which these characteristics incur their weightings could be accumulated 
in some numerical fashion. Indeed, this has been done in a number of 
relevant and reliable studies on performance evaluation using the critical 
incident method upon which the research in this thesis is based.H
The following report of a participant's assessment illustrates a 
number of points pertinent to this thesis:
"This man entered into the assessment exercises in an agreeable 
and energetic way. . . .  In the investment problem (our stock market 
problem) he was rated as one of the two best contributors by the staff 
observers and by his peers. . . . His performance in the discussion 
problem was also rated as one of the better ones by the staff observ­
ers and his peers, although he did not contribute as strongly here as 
he did in the investment problem. The projective tests of personality 
suggest that he prefers team projects over working alone. Part of 
this man's success in group situations is due to his good ability to 
express himself." (And then we cite evidence from the discussion 
problem and from the investment problem. Then we go on to talk about 
his human relations abilities.) "He spent a good deal of time in de­
liberate efforts to get others to feel positively about him. He 
smiled at them, cajoled them, used forms of address such as "old 
buddy, and so forth."
(What you see here is that we attempt to pull together evidence 
from the various techniques around certain traits and characteristics.
. . . Then we talk about his decisiveness, which was gotten from the 
in-basket and the projective tests, and about his motivation, which 
was gotten from the projective tests and the Edwards. Then we go on 
to mental ability. . . . Now we go on to weaknesses.)
Although, as noted above, this man made substantial contributions 
in group situations, he displayed no definite leadership
lOlbid.. p. 123.
^^Gerald H. Whitlock, "Application of the Psychological Law to 
Performance Evaluation," Journal of Applied Psychology, XLVII (February, 
1963), pp. 15-23.
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characteristics. In the group discussion problem, he simply jumped 
into the various discussions which arose, and the issues which were 
discussed. He did not push any proposal of his own and he agreed with 
most of the proposals made by others. . .
It is obvious that the behavioral incidents above are stated in 
a nonrandom and unsystematic fashion, inviting bias, and making it diffi­
cult to compare the man's performance with other candidates. Secondly, 
value judgments are interwoven with factual reporting, causing further 
possibility of confusion.
The "Iceberg Approach"
One of the most difficult problems that has arisen in the use of 
games for performance evaluation is that of defining the success of parti­
cipants. Since game complexity is approaching that of business operations, 
the difficulty of measuring success in the two environments is not too 
dissimilar. A second problem that arises when games are used for evalua­
tion purposes is that of relating individual success to team performance 
(since games are frequently played by a group of persons).
Vance developed a novel approach to both of those problems in a 
study described in the Academy of Management Journal. First, he developed 
a model for measuring success in a game based on what he considered to be 
sound business goals.
The evaluation model is expressed in equation form below:
T = M +  I + C + P + E + D 
where the variables of the equation are defined as:
l^Bray, "Situational Tests," p. 121.
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T = Total Game Performance
M = Share of the Market Performance
I = Inventory Performance
C = Cash Performance
P = Profit Performance
E = Owner's Equity Performance
D = Dividend Performance^^
Each of these factors is assigned a numerically weighted scale of 
points, the total of which becomes the game performance score which mea­
sures the success of participants. The second problem mentioned above, 
that of determining the extent of an individual contribution toward game 
performance is solved by using "teams" comprised of only one person.
While this isolates contributions, it also places serious limitations on 
the type of behavior that can be elicited. In terms of the Seven Expres­
sions of Executive Performance described in Chapter II, "Development of 
Morale" and "Development of Competent Subordinates," would be excluded 
almost entirely.
In spite of these qualifications, Vance and Gray's findings are 
significant to the developing field of gaming for evaluation purposes and 
shed some light on the study being undertaken here. They discovered a 
marked difference between the performance of the first- and third-ranked 
players on at least five of the performance appraisal factors when 63 re­
tailing manager game participants' scores were compared with their ratings 
on their jobs. The five factors indicate a significant correlation between 
their game score and their on-the-job performance in terms of such factors 
as overall job knowledge, judgment, initiative, and health.
^^Stanley C. Vance and Clifford F. Gray, "Use of a Performance 
Evaluation Model for Research in Business Gaming," Academy of Management 
Journal, X, No. 1 (March, 1967), pp. 31-32.
14lbid., pp. 32-33.
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Considering the relevance of the Vance and Gray study to the re­
search study described in this dissertation, the question comes to mind, 
"What are the incidents of behavior or performance specimens supporting 
aggregate ratings in each of these categories?" If the relevant incidents 
or activities by game participants could be isolated, perhaps incidents 
of behavior could be isolaced when evaluating performance for predictive 
purposes.
The most sensitive distinguishing traits discovered in the study 
described by Vance and Gray were "judgment" and "health." Judgment was 
defined as "the ability to make sound, logical decisions on the basis of 
available data," which is precisely the behavior expected to be important 
to success in a game dependent on individual strategy, without interaction 
from other team members. The researcher thinks that the correlation of 
the health rating with success criteria may be accounted for by the rela­
tive high average age of employees and the fact that most game decisions 
were made after a working day.
A similar study to the Teisch research was undertaken in 1964 by 
VanSlyke. However, in this case the research design was drawn somewhat 
tighter by the selection of participants in an equivalent level of manage­
ment in relation to the parent organization, and by the use of a simulation 
game especially designed to match the occupation of the participants, the 
Purdue Farm Supply Business Management Game. The study was designed so 
that a three-way evaluation could be made. The three-way relationships 
are depicted in the diagram which follows
^^VanSlyke, "Psychological Correlates," pp. 19-35.
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Predictors
Business Game
Criteria
Figure 2
The participants in the study were twenty-three county managers 
of farm bureau cooperative associations who were participating in an ex­
perimental workshop held at Purdue University. As in the case of the 
Vance, et al. and the Teisch studies, managers acted independently in play­
ing the game; therefore, the possible environment of behavior elicited was 
somewhat limited, especially in terms of interpersonal relations and the 
leadership function. This limitation becomes critical as will be seen in 
the review of the results of the game. Furthermore, the competitive en­
vironment in the game was established by the game administrator rather 
than allowing for competitive interaction between contestants. This could 
be an added advantage in evaluation of results if realism and competitive 
spirit were not sacrificed too much. The author does not indicate the 
purpose of this innovation, nor whether an attempt was made to equalize 
competition for all participants.
Game success was defined as the maximization of net worth. Both 
objective and subjective measures of on-the-job success (the criteria in 
Figure 2 above) were utilized. The two objective measures of managerial 
success were ratios of net profit as a per cent of sales and operating ex­
penses as a per cent of gross margin, both determined by a financial audit. 
The two subjective measures were a peer-ranking by the participants in a 
pre-game survey and the ranking of participants by a field representative
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from the headquarters of the cooperative association. The third side of 
the triangle, predictors, consisted of a battery of psychological tests.
The results of the Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of these 
triangular relationships are difficult to interpret for a number of rea­
sons. However, verbal aptitude, reasoning ability, numerical aptitude, 
responsibility, and emotional stability were all positively related to 
game success at the p = .05 significance level. Ascendancy, cautiousness, 
and original thinking scales were not related to performance in the busi­
ness game. Most important to this dissertation was the finding that the 
four performance criteria of on-the-job performance achieved no signifi­
cant relationship with game performance.^^
From partial coefficients the researcher determined that socia­
bility and years in present position explained 58 per cent of the 
variation among rankings of managerial ability by the expert, indicating 
a ranking largely on popularity, rather than managerial ability or busi­
ness success.
The author's final conclusions are perceptive and establish a 
well-defined rationale for the research being undertaken in this disser­
tation (although not discovered until after its conception);
The results show significant correlations for the game with both 
cognitive and personality factors. However, no correlations were 
extremely high, and no obvious patterns emerged for which the game 
seems to be an especially good predictor. The question arises of 
just what trait, or group of traits, is to be predicted. . . . None 
of the predictor variables used in the study is known to really pre­
dict well that elusive trait we refer to as managerial ability. In 
fact, somewhat of a void of psychological techniques exists in terms 
of predicting overall managerial success. . . .
16Ibid.
63
This author's experience with study of the business game has left 
one of those abstract after-images— a hunch, if you will— that some 
traits required for managerial success lie cloaked in the business 
game.
The author tends to discount the findings of his study because of 
the raters used— and because of the type of businesses surveyed.
Consultants are available to these managers as needed to assist 
them when in trouble. . . . This "backstopping" by the field force 
makes knowledge of business management techniques less crucial. . . . 
In addition, frequent periodic training sessions are held for these 
managers by the parent organization, so all may have some minimum 
necessary level of management knowledge. With these factors at work, 
the compression effect would serve to weaken considerably the rela­
tions with other variables. . .
VanSlyke cites individual game operation as being the one greatest
inherent weakness of the study. This also seems to be true of the Vance 
and Teisch studies. Unless we are investigating managers for jobs in 
small business management, requiring solely their own services, a critical 
attribute for success is going to be their ability to lead and motivate 
others; to elicit and evaluate decisions rather than to make them alone 
and to recognize, evaluate, and reward effective performance of others. 
None of these activities are evoked by the studies cited thus far in the 
literature, in spite of the fact that this is precisely where the game's 
advantage as a predictor is likely to exist— namely, its ability to pro­
vide a complex and rich environment by creating problems which necessitate 
decision-making in an interpersonal setting.
Dill addressed himself to this problem in 1961:
The best measures to try to derive from observing the players in 
a game are probably not the "traits" for which we search with
^^Ibid., pp. 36-37.
ISibid., p. 38,
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objective personality tests and about which we talk so vaguely in 
management. Instead we can often see the players duplicating the 
specific behaviors we would expect of a good or a poor manager.
Dill believes that Carnegie Tech has been able to use games to 
distinguish among complex attributes of men such as their ability to dis­
cuss critical relationships, accept or reject routine work, express ideas
20clearly, and complete jobs on schedule.
Dill has been unable to find any correlation between success in 
playing the game and raw intelligence, nor with any other personality 
variables. In view of these findings and the fact that raw intelligence 
is not a good predictor of managerial success, he concludes, "The quali­
ties of a good game player may be as elusive as the qualities of a 
manager.
In view of the lack of success of studies thus far to measure 
managerial performance by use of simulations, the focus of this paper will 
now turn to an investigation of the attempts to measure managerial per­
formance in industry. Perhaps the answer to the successful measurement of 
performance in game play lies in the methods discovered as most suitable 
for this well-researched domain.
^^William R. Dill, "What Management Games Do Best," Business Hor­
izons , IV, No. 3 (Fall, 1961), p. 62.
ZOlbid.
Zllbid., p. 63.
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Attentats to Describe and Measure Effective 
Managerial Behavior in Industry
Common Weaknesses in Behavioral Observation
Dunnette provides a very succinct discussion of the sources of 
error in behavioral observation for evaluating performance. These are 
summarized from his discussion below;
1. Inadequate sampling of job behavior. The observations are 
considered deficient if the total set of performance specimens is sketch­
ily or incompletely defined. If irrelevant behaviors are included the 
observations are said to be contaminated.
2. Lack of knowledge, understanding, or rapport of observer. 
According to Dunnette, " . . .  If a supervisor-observer fails to under­
stand the statements or items of a rating form, if he regards them as 
irrelevant or as unimportant, if he does not feel like cooperating with 
those who ask him to complete the form, or if he has had little or only 
limited opportunity to observe either the employee or his job behavior, 
he may adopt . . ."22 patterns such as a central or leniency tendency, a 
halo effect (rating everyone high or low) or other well-known biases in 
rating.
3. Changes in the job environment. Different behaviors may be 
required at different times on a job, especially if a great amount of 
learning is taking place.
O O
Marvin D. Dunnette, Personnel Selection and Placement (Belmont, 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 89-90.
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4. Changes in employee behavior. Dunnette warns against basing 
descriptions of job behavior on a sample of one day's observations, al­
though he considers this a common o c c u r r e n c e .23
Dunnette provides at least partial answers to these problems by 
suggesting that observers should actually develop the rating form to be 
used so that they will understand and have faith in its operation. A com­
promise to this is to check for their agreement on behavioral statements 
as the form is developed. Furthermore, observations should be made over 
a reasonably long time period and preferably should be kept in a Job Anec­
dote File to serve as a "memory jogger" in rating.24
Most important to this thesis is the suggestion by Dunnette that
the critical incident technique be used for involving supervisors in rat- 
25ing form design. This approach is defined later in this chapter.
The Validity of Predictive Instruments 
In 1968 Korman made an extensive investigation of instruments de­
signed to predict managerial performance, reviewing more than fifty 
attempts to capture this elusive quality. In discussing cognitive ability 
tests, he explains that tests such as verbal ability have been unable to 
discriminate among potential managerial candidates except at the lowest 
levels, the reason being " . . .  that the typical managerial applicant 
population is already highly preselected on abilities and is relatively 
homogeneous on these variables. Thus the differentiators will not be
23ibid., p. 91. 24ibid., pp. 89-90.
25ibid., p. 90.
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abilities in the traditional s e n s e . S i m i l a r l y ,  Korman found very low 
correlations between question-and-answer type tests purported to measure 
leadership ability and success criteria, including the rather well-known 
"How Supervise" test. Personal history type tests seem to offer a slight­
ly better predictive ability, but with this instrument also, predictive 
ability diminishes rapidly as one moves into the higher echelons of man­
agement.
Korman found that predictive abilities of "judgmental" type tests, 
where actual managers observed candidates on projective exams, showed 
great improvement over "actuarial" methods. This predictive ability was 
further improved when peer ratings were used, not because of superior 
judgment, but as Korman explains, because of the superior opportunity to 
observe performance. "The difference between this situation and the exec­
utive assessment paradigm is that the information available here is not 
usually test-and-interview data but rather impressions gained from subor­
dinate nature."27
Interestingly enough, although critical incidents were often used 
as a criterion of success in the more valid judgmental ratings reviewed 
by Korman, in no case were they listed as a predictor of success. Most of 
the judgmental studies used as predictors overall ratings by peers or su­
periors based on academic observations or on training camp observations 
(in the case of the military ratings).
2^Abraham K. Korman, "The Prediction of Managerial Performance: 
A Review," Personnel Psychology, XXI, No. 3 (1968), p. 302.
27ibid., p. 313.
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What Korman does not mention, however, is that these overall rat­
ing predictors suffer from one of the weaknesses for which he condemned 
the personal history predictors. He says " . . . personal history items 
tend to lend themselves to a brute empirical approach, where items are 
utilized according to the specific level of correlations involved in the 
specific situation, rather than to the meaningfulness of the variables
and the possible psychological constructs which could lead to an effec-
28tive theory of leadership behavior."
But Korman's discussion proceeds to strengthen the rationale for 
the critical incident method introduced later in this chapter:
It should not be construed that the generally low correlation 
about which we have made slighting remarks here are never of practical 
usefulness. Any "r" is of practical significance providing one can 
slice off an extreme enough group, a situation not completely unknown 
in industrial circles. However, procedures of such institutional use­
fulness contribute little to our knowledge of managerial behavior, a 
theoretical matter which we believe will lead to greater practical 
significance in the end. Neither are they of assistance when the man­
agerial talent grows slim, a situation which will become increasingly 
common in our exploding society.29
In other words the predictors used should not only predict success, 
but should also tell us something about the cause of the success being pre­
dicted, i.e., managerial behavior. From the above studies the following 
conclusions are drawn concerning a system for predicting effective mana­
gerial performance in business simulations.
1. Any method used to describe managerial type behavior and to 
record it for predictive purposes must avoid deficiencies and contamination. 
It must systematically sample in a random fashion all relevant behavior 
over a reasonable period of time.
28ibid., p. 308. p. 319.
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2. It must possess face validity to the rater; therefore, his 
own observations and thoughts, or those of persons similar to him, need to 
be incorporated into it.
3. It must be judgmental in nature rather than actuarial and 
should probably include the judgment of peers as well as supervisors.
4. In order to distinguish among a number of highly capable peo­
ple (such as managerial candidates at the top levels, or graduate students) 
a relatively high correlation is required between the predictor and the 
criterion of success.
The Critical Incident Method
Although this thesis is more concerned with instruments having 
predictive ability than those used for evaluative purposes, the potential 
use of a business game may possibly allow both the prediction and evalua­
tion functions to be performed with the same instrument. This is true 
because the game provides a rich and varied environment for the observa­
tion of performance over long periods of "compressed" time. For this 
reason the rationale for the critical incident method will be discussed 
below.
The critical incident method of performance appraisal is an out­
growth of studies performed during World War 11 by the personnel of the 
American Institute of Research. The method consists of three main pro­
cedures: (1) obtaining critical incidents of the job, (2) combining
these incidents to form the critical requirements of the job, and (3)
30listing these critical requirements in the form of a checklist.
30American Institute for Research, A Report of Three Years of 
Experience (Pittsburgh: American Institute for Research, September, 1950),
p. 3.
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The following definitions are provided by the American Institute 
for Research:
The critical requirements for an activity are those that are cru­
cial in the sense that they have been frequently observed to make the 
difference between success and failure in that activity. . . . Criti­
cal incidents are descriptions of things people did which were 
especially effective or ineffective in accomplishing specific tasks.
The procedure for collecting observational data is called the 
critical incident technique. Following this procedure immediate super­
visors or other competent observers are asked to report from memory 
previous observations of workers' behavior on the job. Complex jobs per­
formed under various conditions usually require two or three thousand 
critical incidents, while simpler or more homogeneous jobs require only a 
few hundred incidents. A device suggested to insure a random sample of 
unbiased incidents is to request the most recent occurrence of some well- 
pronounced incident, e.g., a reprimand, a transfer, an accident, or a 
grievance.^2
Flanagan lists five specific conditions that must be satisfied in 
regard to observations of job behavior. They are as follows:
a. It is essential that actual observations be made of on-the- 
job activity and the product of such activity.
b. The aims and objectives of the activity must be known to the 
observer. Unless this condition is fulfilled it will be impossible 
for the observer or judge to identify success or failure. . . .
c. The basis for the specific judgments to be made by the ob­
server must be clearly defined. The data can be objective only if all 
observers are following the same rules. All observers must have the 
same criteria for making judgments. . . .
31lbid.
32john C. Flanagan, "Job Requirements," Current Trends in Indus­
trial Psychology (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1949),
pp. 45-46.
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d. The observer must be qualified to make judgments regarding 
the activity observed. . . •
e. The last necessary condition, is that reporting be accurate.
. . .33
After the critical incidents are obtained, a preliminary examina­
tion is made and six to ten major area headings are set up to aid in 
classification. These will probably be modified during the process. As 
the critical behaviors are separated into main areas, they are also 
grouped into sub-areas and similar behavioral incidents are bound together 
to form a single unit in the sorting process. Definitions for areas and 
sub-areas are formulated and the units are then sorted once again. After 
this, a category statement is written to cover each group of similar crit­
ical behaviors. Isolated incidents are placed in a reject file for 
further examination. The category statements thus derived constitute the 
critical requirements for the job studied.3^
In 1956, the critical incident technique had been used to deter­
mine the critical requirements for Air Force officers, airline pilots, 
air traffic controllers, B-29 combat crews, scientists, factory workers, 
life insurance agents, teachers, and dentists.33 Since that time the 
critical requirements for nurses and college professors have been formu­
lated.
The critical incident method has developed critical incidents
33john C. Flanagan, "Defining the Requirements of the Executive's 
Job." Personnel, XXVIII, No. 35 (July, 1951), pp. 28-35.
34ibid.
^^June Teig Bailey, "The Critical incident Technique in Identify­
ing Behavioral Criteria of Professional Nursing Effectiveness," Nursing 
Research, V (October, 1956), p. 55.
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proven to be valid and reliable criteria of success in various performance 
evaluation studies in industry. For this reason it is chosen as the most 
likely method for developing a predictor of success, given the rich and 
complex environment of a business simulation.
The predictive model developed can be summarized at this point by 
the illustration in Figure 1, page 6.
Step 1: First, definitions should be written of the goals of the
organization for which the managers are employed and evaluated. Next, a 
game model should be designed which could elicit activities oriented 
toward each of these goals. (See Block 1.)
Step 2: Next, the goals defined in Step 1 should be defined in
terras of the appearance they would take on when performed effectively by 
the top managers. (See Block 2.)
Step 3: Actual performance specimens of managerial behavior on
the job should be collected for each position for which success is to be 
predicted. These should be obtained and classified by use of the critical 
incident method. Similar observations should be made of parallel posi­
tions in business game play and critical incidents should be developed as 
on the job. (See Blocks 3 and 4.)
The critical incidents developed in each channel of Figure 1 
should continually be related back to organizational goals by way of top 
executive performance. Furthermore, any basic disagreement between crit­
ical incidents discovered on the job and in the game for the same position 
should be resolved by adjusting the game environment and rechecking the 
results by a collection of more performance specimens. (See Block 5.)
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Summary
In Chapter IV the major attempts to use business games and other 
simulations for predictive purposes were reviewed. The weaknesses of at­
tempts to evaluate managerial behavior and predict success on the job were 
then discussed.
In order to develop business games as predictors of success in 
industry, a criterion channel development and a predictive channel devel­
opment were suggested. The major device found to offer promise in the 
development of both of these channels was the critical incident technique 
which was described and discussed.
Chapter V will give an account of some exploratory research de­
signed to test the major hypothesis of this thesis. This hypothesis is 
that the critical incident technique can be used successfully to describe 
the managerial behavior being elicited by business games.
CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
The critical incident studies described in this chapter were de­
signed to determine the kinds of managerial behavior elicited by business 
games.
Collection of Data
The raw data for use in describing game behavior was obtained 
from the following studies:
Study A. A questionnaire handout to an Introduction to Business 
class of freshmen students participating in a general management game 
(N = 51).
Study B. A questionnaire handout to a group of junior Marketing 
Management students participating in a marketing game (N = 41).
Study C. A questionnaire handout to a group of senior students 
participating in a general management game (N = 14).
Study D. Consisted of three questionnaires to similar groups 
(1) a nationwide mailout to businessmen and professors known to be inter­
ested in business gaming (N = 190), (2) a mailout to the American 
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business by way of the Marketing and 
Management departments (N = 278), and, (3) a mailout to participants in a 
faculty development seminar held at Oklahoma Christian College, including 
professors from twenty-one colleges and universities from a six-state 
area (N = 33) .
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Construction of Critical Incident Checklists
The checklists in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 to be found in the follow­
ing pages were independently designed using a process developed by 
Flanagan^ and described more fully in Chapters II and IV of this thesis. 
However, Flanagan combined performance specimens into rather general cate­
gories called "critical requirements," whereas in this study they have 
been left in a more specific state called "critical incidents" so that 
they could be readily observed for consideration in predictive and eval­
uative studies.
Using Flanagan's methodology, the incidents in each study were 
sorted into several categories of performance called "factors." At first 
categories were general in nature and only served to facilitate the sort­
ing process. As performance specimens were separated into main areas, 
they were grouped into subareas of performance and similar specimens were 
bound together to form one unit in the sorting process. Definitions for 
the factors were then formulated more precisely and the units were re­
sorted. An important aspect of this procedure was the fact that no area 
of performance was chosen arbitrarily as being important to game perfor­
mance. Rather, critical incidents and factors were all derived from the 
manner in which the performance specimens could be logically grouped.
In Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the following pages, it will be noted 
that the factors derived from the studies are numbered with Roman numer­
als. Under each category some critical incidents are representative of
i*
John C. Flanagan, "Defining the Requirements of the Executive's 
Job," Personnel. XXVIII (July, 1951), pp. 30-31.
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"effective performance" and some are representative of "ineffective per­
formance." No attempt was made to reverse effective or ineffective 
performance since the criticality of an incident to overall performance 
depends on the manner in which it is observed and the attitude formed by 
the observer. Past studies have indicated that some items are only con­
sidered critical to success when they appear in negative form, since most 
persons perform them satisfactorily. In like manner, some types of be­
havior are so often observed in negative form that they are considered 
commonplace or "the usual." Only when someone performs effectively in 
these areas does his performance become critical to success.
In the column to the right of each checklist (Tables 2, 3, 4, and 
5) the percentage of individual performance specimens reported for each 
critical incident category is shown.
Behavior Reported in Study A 
Many of the characteristics of the six studies described above 
are similar and will be discussed as Study A is described in more detail.
At the time these data were collected, students in the Introduc­
tion to Business class had played eight moves in the UCLA game No. 2, a 
top-management, dynamic, interactive business simulation. The game re­
quires aggregative decisions on price, advertising, research and 
development, production volume, and dividends to be paid. In addition, 
students were required to design a physical product on paper and to devise 
a brand name for it. Teams were rated on this product.
The questionnaire used in this study is included in Appendix A.
In all of the studies itemized above, including Study A, persons were
77
asked to respond to a request similar to the following:
Please describe briefly an incident concerning the action of a 
participant in a business game, that you observed or learned about 
first-hand, which in your opinion was an example of unusually effec­
tive game performance (or unusually ineffective, as the case may be). 
Please describe exactly what occurred, giving only enough detail to 
explain why the act was unusually effective or unusually ineffective. 
(See Appendixes A, B, C and D.)
In Study A no examples were given and no categories of behavior 
were suggested. In each case respondents were allowed to submit as many 
performance specimens as they wished, but at least one effective and one 
ineffective specimen was requested. Table 2, on the following page, sum­
marizes the critical incidents of behavior derived from the performance 
specimens submitted in Study A, categorized into similar areas of behavior 
defined as "factors."
In order to explain what is meant by a performance specimen and 
how these are sorted into a critical incident category, the two specimens 
that made up critical incident 1 under PLANNING in Table 2 are given below:
One student suggested that we sell all inventories at a reasonable 
price, build up the firm, and increase dividends of the stockholders. 
Our price was reasonable, the inventories sold, and the firm increased 
in size with increasing dividends for the stockholders.
Our team accepted the strategy of one student who suggested that
we correspondingly raise advertising and the price of goods. This was 
to be done very slowly while channeling money away from R & D and 
plant into an increase in dividends. This kept our team among the 
top three teams during the whole game.
Under ANALYSIS AND CLARIFICATION OF INTEGRATED RELATIONSHIPS it 
can be observed that some critical incidents are reversible. They were 
considered critical to successful performance whether observed occurring 
in a positive manner or a negative manner. Critical incidents 6 and 8 in 
Table 2 are examples of this phenomenon. The following two specimens are
examples of ones used in support of incidents 6 and 8, respectively:
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TABLE 2
RELATIVE FREQUENCY IN PER CENT OF TOTAL PERFORMANCE SPECIMENS
REPORTED FROM STUDY A FOR EACH CRITICAL INCIDENT
AND FACTOR OF MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR
Per Cent 
(N = 117)
I. PLANNING .................................................
1. Took time to engage in long-ran planning .........
Developed a successful strategy for the team . . .
Persuaded team to take reasonable risks .........
Failed to provide enough time for proper planning 
Failed to spend enough time planning .............
2.
3.
4.
5.
II. ANALYSIS AND CLARIFICATION OF INTEGRATED RELATIONSHIPS
6. Showed a good understanding of game variables . .
7. Used special functional knowledge for team benefits
8. Failed to develop an understanding of game relation
ships ...............................................
5.8 
. 8
1.7
1.7 
.8 
.8
6.9 
2 . 6
1.7
2 . 6
III. DECISION-MAKING .............................................
9. Predicted results of decisions accurately ............
10. Was innovative in providing new ideas ...............
11. Made a decision that proved to be successful .........
12. Favored close adherence to goals and objectives . . .
13. Made decisions without considering integrated relation­
ships ...................................................
14. Suggested irrelevant thoughts and ideas often . . . .
IV. PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ...........
15. Boosted morale by interest and preparation . . . .
16. Carried more than his share of work ..............
17. Carried out work assignments effectively .........
18. Performed an unloyal act in the game .............
19. Failed to take care of assigned responsibilities .
20. Failed to show up for team meetings ..............
21. Showed little or no interest in team's activities
17.0
1.7
5.1 
2.6
1.7
.8
5.1
48.7 
3.4
7.7
4.3 
.8
4.3
12.8 
15.4
V. LEADERSHIP .................................................
22. Divided team responsibilities equitably ............
23. Prompted teammates to acquire understanding of game
24. Listened to ideas of others .........................
25. Showed leadership in planning and analyzing strategy
26. Acted as integrating force in group decision-making
27. Dominated excessively in leadership capacity . . . .
21.3
2 . 6
1.7
.8
11.1
.8
4.3
T o t a l * .................................. 100.0
*Total does not add to 100 due to rounding.
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One person many times noticed an "insignificant" fact which later 
proved important in determining our action and greatly changing our 
income.
One person blindly reacted to the results of each decision. When 
the return was good, he advised additional, heavy investment and when 
the return was not so good he would advise completely reversing our 
strategy and not following our original goals. He didn't realize that 
certain effects of our strategy were cumulative and were not apparent 
immediately.
It is interesting to note under DECISION-MAKING that the effective 
incident supported with the greatest number of specimens, number 10, also 
appeared as an ineffective incident supported by the largest number of 
specimens, when these ideas were irrelevant. One representative effective 
specimen and one representative ineffective specimen is included below:
When we had to name our popcorn popper only one person (a girl) 
other than myself showed up. We sat down and began to think of some 
necessary qualities for our product. It turned into a sort of brain­
storming session. She was intelligent and innovative and I enjoyed 
working with her very much.
One of our team members was a hindrance in reaching decisions be­
cause he continually talked about irrelevant ideas.
Incidents occurring under PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSI­
BILITY of Table 2 appeared most often in the ineffective category. This 
is probably because participants are expected to accept their delegated 
responsibilities; therefore, teammates do not consider this acceptance 
unusually effective performance. The more unique incidents to be found 
under PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY in Table 2 are numbers 15 
and 18. A supporting performance specimen for each of them is given 
below:
One person in our group was very interested and very involved in 
the game. He was always reading up on some things that might help us.
One member had a sketch of a popcorn popper. We didn't like the 
popcorn popper's design but we were going to use the brand name and
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trademark with the design of another member. The first member, how­
ever, became disgruntled and gave his drawing to another team. It 
might have cost us first place in the drawing evaluation.
Leadership activities in business games seem to be largely those 
that develop because of an emerging informal leader. Teams are usually 
too jealous of the democratic atmosphere to endow a teammate with very 
much formal authority. Furthermore, they usually do not know each other 
very well and age differences between managerial levels are not as great 
as is often the case in industry. From an observation of incidents 22-27 
in Table 2, it can be seen that a number of characteristics seem to cause 
these emerging leaders to be considered effective. If they can divide 
responsibilities effectively or help others understand what to them is 
considered a complicated environment--the game— they are considered effec­
tive. Being willing to listen well and to integrate group decision-making 
activities also gives them increased stature.
On the basis of frequency of specimens reported, the ability to 
plan and analyze strategy seemed to be a most important attribute for team 
leaders. Overdomination of fellow teammates was a frequently cited weak­
ness .
Every student surveyed in Study A responded with at least one 
specimen. The total number of performance specimens collected was 117 for 
an average of 2.3 per student. Of these 117 specimens, 61 were examples 
of effective behavior and 56 were examples of ineffective behavior.
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Behavior Reported in Study B
The game used in this study was Ralph Day's Marketing in Action.% 
It, too, requires aggregative decisions, but it deemphasizes production 
and finance in favor of a richer marketing function. Students are allowed 
to sell more than one product. A wide range of products can be chosen on 
the basis of their appeal to three submarkets and various types of market­
ing research can be purchased. The game was further enriched by requiring 
a product package design and brand name project and by requiring formal 
presentations of team strategy at the end of game play. Table 3 on the 
following page summarizes the incidents and factors derived from the per­
formance specimens submitted in Study B,
Since students in the junior-level course from which these data 
were reported were requested to write formal statements of objectives and 
policies, more emphasis on these items could be expected than in the 
freshman game designated as Study A. The following performance specimens 
supported critical incidents 1 and 3 in Table 3:
One person started out right at the first to make us a large out­
put, low price firm. Basing the output on capturing 40% of the 
market. In the first month we sold more than expected and thereafter 
had the opportunity to raise price. Since then, we have lowered price 
slightly, used a moderate advertising and sales force policy and have 
held our share of the market and of profits.
The lifesaving effort of one member probably kept us from going 
broke. We had allowed ourselves to be led away from our company pol­
icies. We started losing and the main leader forced us back to the 
guidelines. The team members, responding to his strong leadership, 
started working and reaped high profits.
The game used in Study B also included opportunities for buying 
research information which was not true of the freshman game described in
^Ralph Day, Marketing in Action (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1968).
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TABLE 3
RELATIVE FREQUENCY IN PER CENT OF TOTAL PERFORMANCE SPECIMENS
REPORTED FROM STUDY B FOR EACH CRITICAL INCIDENT AND
FACTOR OF MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR
PLANNING ...............................................
1. Established well defined objectives and policies
2. Followed objectives and policies consistently
3. Was profit-minded and goal-oriented ...........
4. Failed to provide balanced planning ...........
II.
III.
ANALYSIS AND CLARIFICATION OF INTEGRATED RELATIONSHIPS . 
5. Developed an effective standard operating procedure
DECISION-MAKING ..........................................
5. Performed useful formal or informal research . . . .  
Developed or supported the use of graphs or charts . 
Showed skill in assessing and using numerical data . 
Interjected inconsistent strategy without just cause 
Helped team recognize critical relationships . . . .  
Showed creativity by suggesting many game solutions 
Showed proper caution and common sense in making
decisions .............................................
Made or favored decisions unsupported by facts . . .
Made ineffective decisions frequently .............
Failed to project outcome of decisions .............
7.
8. 
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
IV. PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY .............
16. Was unusually dependable in attending meetings . . .
17. Carried more than his share of workload ............
18. Remained knowledgeable through continual preparation
19. Often failed to fulfill work commitments ............
20. Often late or irregular in attendance of meetings
21. Refused to accept delegated responsibility .........
V. LEADERSHIP.............................................
22. Often brought about agreement in group meetings 
Took command of unstructured groups in agreeable
fashion ..........................................
Admitted mistakes willingly ....................
Never stated an opinion without valid support 
Motivated others to strive toward organizational
goals .............................................
27. Was articulate in communicating ideas .........
23.
24.
25.
26.
Per Cent 
(N = 77)
7.8
1.3
1.3
3.9
1.3
6.5
6.5
37.7
3.9
9.1
3.9
3.9
3.9
5.2
1.3
1.3
1.3
3.9
16.9
1.3
1.3
2.6
5.2
3.9 
2.6
31.2
5.2
2 . 6
1.3
1.3
1.3 
2 . 6
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TABLE 3— Continued
Per Cent 
(N = 77)
V. LEADERSHIP (Continued)
28. Was persuasive in communicating ideas ................
29. Used humor effectively ...............................
30. Showed optimism and courage during period of failure
31. Failed to establish an effective communication system
32. Failed to present thoughts in organized fashion . . .
33. Presented ideas with a domineering attitude .........
34. Blamed lack of contribution to team on personal 
problems ...............................................
35. Was argumentative and contentious in discussions . .
1.3 
2.6
3.9
1.3
1.3
3.9
1.3
1.3
To t a l * ................................... 100.0
*Total does not add to 100 due to rounding.
Study A. This accounts for the appearance of critical incident 6 in
Table 3 which is supported by the following performance specimens:
One member suggested that we begin buying the GNP forecast. This 
led to a significant decrease in our per cent of error in our forecast.
One person analyzes and uses market research to such an extent that
through him we are coming very close to our forecast and at times have
missed by less than one per cent of error for the month.
The LEADERSHIP incidents reported seemed to be better defined and 
represented more sophisticated behavior in Study B than in the case of 
the freshmen in Study A. Some of the performance specimens from which 
critical incident 22 in Table 3 was written illustrate this depth of un­
derstanding and of reporting:
One effective student leader would take the best of the opinions 
and discuss the various alternatives with other team members. The 
whole process was very democratic with a leader open to opinions.
The way in which he handled the meetings gave everyone an opportunity 
to express his opinion and prevented the "railroading" of any ideas 
of the minority or majority over the ideas of any other person.
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When making decisions for our forecasts and price we almost always 
disagree. "Mr. A" is good about bringing about a compromise among us 
as a group. He is also good at communication. For example, when 
someone doesn't understand how the decision was made or brought about, 
he is good about showing and explaining. Other teammates sometimes 
have a "don't care" attitude.
One team member is unusually effective in his relationships with 
other members of the team. He is the pivot point for all discussions. 
Whenever a far-out decision is presented this person vetoes the deci­
sion. His strength comes from his understanding of the interaction 
of the variables. He uses past results in formulating a decision.
It is interesting to note that the first two specimens above ap­
plied to the same game participant and show how two teammates viewed his 
qualities somewhat differently.
Of the 77 performance specimens obtained in Study B, 52 were
examples of effective behavior and 25 were examples of ineffective behav­
ior. Again, all students responded with at least one performance specimen.
The questionnaire used in Study B is contained in Appendix B.
Behavior Reported in Study C
The game played in this study was a top-management, aggregative 
decision type game, played by upper-level undergraduates at the University 
of South Carolina. It was much more complicated than the ones used in the 
previous studies, incorporating a richer production variable, calling for 
machine scheduling, bid decisions on contracts, and offering various 
sources for purchasing materials. The incidents and factors derived from 
this study are shown in Table 4 on the following page.
The unique bid decision variable arose in the following perfor­
mance specimen generalized in incident 4 of Table 4:
In deciding what our bid price on a government contract should be,
we found we could supply the units for $9.75 and just break even.
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TABLE 4
RELATIVE FREQUENCY IN PER CENT OF TOTAL PERFORMANCE SPECIMENS
REPORTED FROM STUDY C FOR EACH CRITICAL INCIDENT AND
FACTOR OF MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR
Per Cent 
(N = 23)
I. P L A N N I N G ....................................................... 47.6
1. Extended planning over reasonable period of time . . .  8.7
2. Took reasonable r i s k s ..................................  13.0
3. Failed to make realistic plans for the future . . . .  4.3
4. Failed to consider diverse factors for balanced
p l a n n i n g .................................................. 4.3
5. Procrastinated too long before planning ............... 4.3
6. Made an error that cost company m o n e y .............   . 13.0
11. D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G .............................................  21.7
7. Based decisions on long-run plans ......................  4.3
8. Made a decision that proved to be e f f e c t i v e .........  4.3
9. Made a decision that proved to be ineffective . . . .  8.7
10. Violated established policies in decision-making . . .  4.3
111. LEADERSHIP....................................................  30.4
11. Developed procedures for group decision-making . . . .  4.3
12. Took command of unstructured g r o u p s ..................  4.3
13. Divided responsibilities equitably among group members 8.7
14. Persuaded others to accept his viewpoint by superior
p l a n n i n g .................................................. 4.3
15. Failed to provide proper delegation needed to develop
subordinates .............................................  4.3
16. Was unable to bring about effective compromises . . .  4.3
T o t a l * .................................. 100.0
*Total does not add to 100 due to rounding.
This was our minimum price. However, in determining the lowest price 
we could bid and obtain the contract, we noted that many other compan­
ies who were not aware of costs, bid as high as $17.78 and still 
obtained contracts, which proved to be very successful. This proves 
there is more to success than just using figures.
Incident 1 of Table 4, dealing with extended planning, was derived 
from the following incidents:
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The first quarter we went on four^quarter materials contract.
This reduced our cost of goods sold and increased our net income for 
the first few quarters.
My fellow teammates predicted our cash flow during the first quar­
ter which enabled us to be one of the two teams which did not have an 
overdraft.
The reverse situation is seen in a specimen submitted by a com­
petitor which supports incident 5 of Table 4.
We were very undecided about what goals we should set for our 
company when we made our first decision. As a result we took the 
wait-and-see-what-happens attitude, which our professor warned us 
against. Our company had a sizeable overdraft for the first quarter. 
Realizing the need for a change in our thinking we sat down and 
planned our moves and tried to measure their effects. We planned a 
cash flow every quarter as we should have done at first. Since then 
we have done pretty well.
Critical incident 8 represents a managerial ability so hard to de­
fine but so important to success — the ability to make the "right" 
decisions most of the time. A specimen supporting incident 8 follows:
One of my teammates encouraged us to buy finished products from 
another team on a bid basis. We received the bid and were able to 
double our profits in a quarter which was seasonally lower than the 
previous quarter. Our profit soared from $5,200 to $11,300.
Incident 15 of Table 4 is supported by a performance specimen il­
lustrating a weakness rather common in games (and perhaps in industry):
One individual assumed the leadership of filling out the forms of 
our game. This was fine until he dropped the course and remaining 
members had to complete the forms. Due to their lack of experience 
several mistakes were made in setting up strategy.
Another critical incident under LEADERSHIP, number 11 of Table 4, 
shows a more formal adherence to this function than in previous studies 
of less advanced students:
One member of our team took over and developed a set of proce­
dures to follow for making decisions. Each quarter a member of the 
team would be assigned a different task to perform. This person's
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interest helped to get everyone actively involved and enthusiastic 
about the game. We were also able to make more realistic and meaning­
ful decisions.
Of the 23 performance specimens obtained in Study C, 13 described 
ineffective behavior and 10 described effective behavior. The question­
naire package for this study is included in Appendix C.
Behavior Reported in Study D
Of the 190 questionnaires mailed out to individual professors who 
were interested in gaming, 44 either returned the letter indicating they 
were not a part of the gaming population or else could not be reached at 
the address known. A response of 21 per cent was received from the 146 
remaining questionnaires.
The 278 questionnaire mailouts to Chairmen of Departments of Mar­
keting and Management produced 57 returns for a return of 21 per cent.
This included 48 different schools for a return by American Association 
of Collegiate Schools of Business of 34 per cent. Since many of the pro­
fessors reached by the individual mailout described were employed in the 
AACSB schools, it seemed reasonable to include them as representative of 
the respondents from the AACSB mailout. Indeed, several of these profes­
sors probably received the individual mailout first and then received the 
referred one from their Chairmen, causing them to discard the referred 
questionnaire. If the individual responses are added to the AACSB re­
sponses, the latter percentage return increases to a professional return 
of 27 per cent. By selecting only responses from schools not responding 
in the Chairman referral and adding them to the number of schools respond­
ing, a total of 61 different schools responding is obtained. Some
88
responded from both departments. This means that someone from 44 per cent 
of the AACSB schools responded with a completed questionnaire.
Judging from information disclosed in a survey of these schools 
performed in 1964, it seems unlikely that over 75 or 80 per cent of the 
AACSB schools now have a professor utilizing business gaming techniques. 
The mailout failed to include a request for a qualifying response on this 
question; therefore, many of the schools to which questionnaires were sub­
mitted may not be a part of the population for which the questions were 
intended.
A 40 per cent return was received from the 33 participants in the 
business game seminar at Oklahoma Christian College.
Since all of the three latter studies described above were mailed 
to professors with similar opportunities to observe game participants' 
behavior, and since the research was defined as exploratory rather than 
an attempt to statistically validate some point, all three mailout re­
sponses were combined into Study D and were used to derive Table 5 on the 
following pages.
Since Study D is a much more extensive one than Studies A, B, and 
C, and since the performance specimens received in many categories show 
great similarity to the ones previously reported, only the more unique 
factors, incidents, and specimens from it will be explored. In addition 
to the five groupings reported from Studies A and B (Tables 2 and 3) the 
additional ones of ORGANIZATION, ETHICAL CONDUCT, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
were derived from the 232 performance specimens reported in Study D.
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TABLE 5
RELATIVE FREQUENCY IN PER CENT OF TOTAL PERFORMANCE
SPECIMENS REPORTED FROM STUDY D FOR EACH CRITICAL
INCIDENT AND FACTOR OF MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR
Per Cent 
(N = 232)
I. P L A N N I N G ......................................................  18.10
1. Included provisions for various contingencies . . . .  .43
2. Developed a plan that was simple to administer . . . .  .43
3. Showed unusually good understanding of standard busi­
ness relationships in planning ......................... .86
4. Peisuaded team to follow long-run goals consistently . 2.59
5. Developed unique record-keeping procedures for game . .86
6. Planned recklessly for short-run only ................  3.02
7. Influenced team to develop unrealistic objectives . . 3.88
8. Failed to persuade group to keep standard records . . .86
9. Showed lack of understanding of basic business rela­
tionships in p l a n n i n g .................................. .86
10. Focused on sub-goals at expense of company goals . . .  1.29
11. Made an error in analyzing d a t a ....................... 1.29
12. Failed to follow objectives consistently ..............  .86
13. Failed to establish specific objectives ..............  .86
II. ANALYSIS AND CLARIFICATION OF INTEGRATED RELATIONSHIPS . . 16.81
14. Developed unique method of analyzing variables . . . .  .43
15. Developed accurate systems of predicting decisions of
c o m p e t i t o r s .............................................  1.29
16. Encouraged team to plot graphs or c h a r t s ..............  2.16
17. Used computerized operations research methods of
an a l y s i s .................................................. 3.88
18. Projected long-run analysis of forecasts ..............  1.29
19. Recognized a valuable game interrelationship .........  3.45
20. Analyzed failures to make improvements................  .86
21. Failed to recognize interrelationships ................  1.29
22. Overlooked significance or insignificance of a variable 1.29
23. Ignored factual data available for decision-making . . .86
III. ORGANIZATION.................................................. 12.50
24. Increased effectiveness by changing organizational
s t r u c t u r e ...............................................  .86
25. Organized team into functional areas with one coordi­
nator or l e a d e r ......................................... 3.88
26. Organized on a democratic basis causing ineffective
time utilization and lack of c o o r d i n a t i o n ...........  3.45
27. Failed to delegate duties properly ..................... 2.16
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TABLE 5— Continued
III. ORGANIZATION (Continued)
Per Cent 
(N = 232)
VI.
28. Decentralized greatly without control provisions . .
29. Caused discontinuity by rotating leadership . . . .
30. Organized decision structure that easily elicited 
quarrels between functional areas ..................
31. Organized with overdependence on functional specialist
IV. DECISION-MAKING ...........................................
32. Sacrificed short-run for long-run results ..........
33. Included provisions for contingencies in decisions .
34. Anticipated competitors' reactions successfully . .
35. Applied operations research or computer programs suc­
cessfully in making and implementation of decisions
36. Made or implemented a successful decision .........
37. Balanced "subjective and objective factors" in deci­
sions ..................................................
38. Failed to anticipate competitors' reactions accurately
39. Failed to successfully implement a decision . . . .
40. Overemphasized "objective" or "subjective" factors in
decisions .............................................
41. Allowed personal bias toward functional area or indus
trial setting to unduly influence strategy .........
42. Made a significant error in decision-making . . . .
43. Unsuccessfully made or implemented a decision . . .
V. PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ...........
44. Volunteered to perform special staff services . .
45. Overcame a personality conflict ..................
46. Refused to accept formally appointed leader . . .
47. Contributed no independent thoughts to team . . .
48. Was unable to integrate self well into activities
49. Failed to carry his share of responsibilities . .
50. Showed lack of concern over company goals . . . .
LEADERSHIP ..................................................
51. Developed capabilities of others by perceptive train­
ing, coaching, or job placement ....................
52. Minimized the problem of an overdominant team member
53. Inspired or stimulated team to put forth extra effort
54. Delegated responsibilities to others properly , . .
55. Showed faith in the functional abilities of others .
56. Elicited great effort from other team members . . .
.86
.43
.43
.43
19.82
.43
.43
.43
2.59
4.31
2.43
.43
2.16
2.16
1.72 
1.29 
3.45
7.32 
.86 
.86 
.43
1.72 
.43
2.59 
.43
22.81
2.16
.43
.86
.86
.86
1.72
VIII.
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TABLE 5— Continued
VI. LEADERSHIP (Continued)
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
67.
68.
Insisted on defining and following specific goals .
Gained acceptance of strategy by others ...........
Showed skill at negotiating with outside interests 
Encouraged group to work their way out of difficul­
ties .................................................
Assumed dominance causing team to violate goals . . 
Dominated decision-making and team activities causing
low morale and poor results .........................
Was unable to delegate responsibilities to others . 
Formally appointed leader lost control of his firm 
Allowed personal interests to interfere with perfor­
mance
Reduced efforts in the face of poor results . 
Was argumentative, reducing team effectiveness 
Dominated decision-making and team activities 
causing low morale, but good results . . . .
VII. ETHICAL CONDUCT ...........................................
69. Became involved in a conflict of interests . . . .
70. Became preoccupied with extra-legal methods to win
71. Tried to obtain information in an unethical way . .
PUBLIC RELATIONS ........................................
72. Showed good judgment in assisting a community project
73. Lost control and became angry ......................
74. Performed an act that caused bad publicity for firm
Total*
Per Cent 
(N = 232)
3.02
1.29 
.43
1.29 
.86
5.16
.43
.43
.43
.86
.43
1.29
1.29 
.43 
.43 
.43
2.15
.43
.86
.86
100.00
- *Total does not add to 100.00 due to rounding.
Since Study D included specimens from complicated games such as 
the Carnegie Tech game, more sophisticated gaming practices were reported 
for it. Critical incident 17 (Table 5) dealing with operations research 
methods illustrates this sophistication. The following three items are 
performance specimens representative of the nine items making up this 
critical incident:
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A student asked for assistance in obtaining time on the computer 
to complete a detailed analysis of the sales function using OR tech­
niques; he had been tracking the sales function week by week, testing 
and revising a model that appeared to be useful in making price and
marketing decisions and predicting their impact on sales.
One student who became particularly interested in the game decided 
to attempt to run a multiple regression analysis on the simulation 
game. This action prompted other teams playing the game to also run 
a regression analysis. Interest became so great in the use of regres­
sion analysis as a decision-making tool, that special classes were 
set up by the school faculty to cover the use of the computer termi­
nals and the interpretation of data gathered from the regression 
analysis.
The president of one of the teams worked out a complicated mathe­
matical formula which predicted the demand for the product. As a
result of his effort, the profits of the firm were higher than com­
peting teams. Advertising expenditures were decreased, thus resulting 
in lower costs.
The factor ORGANIZATION from Table 5 will be explored in some de­
tail due to its unique appearance in Study D. One generalization that 
could be made is that all of the critical incident categories 26-31 rep­
resent ineffective types of organizational arrangements. This leaves only 
the traditional functional organization described in incident 25 as being 
effective for game play. It cannot be determined whether this was an 
academic bias on the part of the persons submitting specimens or whether 
it has in fact proven to be superior, but the latter seems more likely.
The following performance specimen is the most descriptive one supporting 
incident 24 of Table 5:
IBM invited professors from three colleges to compete against one 
another in an intensive all-day session. I was elected president and 
proceeded to organize our efforts. Inasmuch as three of our six mem­
bers were marketing professors, I placed each of them in charge of a 
"territory." Unfortunately they began to compete against one another 
rather than against other teams, and we lost money rapidly. Finally 
a reorganization which centralized marketing corrected the problem.
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A number of teams reported trying to use committee management or 
a perfectly democratic procedure in Studies A, B, and C. However, for 
some reason they did not recognize ORGANIZATION as being a problem— al­
though weak leadership and a lack of responsibility was cited often in 
those studies. Game administrators in Study D often observed and reported 
this problem. It is summarized as critical incident 26 and supported by 
several performance specimens similar to the following:
One student organized the teams along the lines of democratic 
committee action with no strong leadership apparent. The result was 
a loss of responsibility for intelligent analysis and research. De­
cisions were based on random and "off-the-top-of-the-head" logic.
Funds were used unwisely.
Failure to delegate and communicate caused a number of problems
represented by incident 27 of Table 5. The following two specimens were 
among the ones reported in this area:
Corporate Personnel (graduate students) had little communication 
with plant personnel (undergraduates) built into the organizational 
structure. One of the corporate decisions was to ship finished prod­
ucts from one plant to another. Time after time corporate people 
would tranship and the undergraduates wouldn't know where "X" number 
of tons of steel disappeared to. This happened only because corpo­
rate headquarters didn't inform the plants what was going on.
The game allowed for teams to acquire other teams. After acqui­
sition a team was unable to assimilate five new team members, thus 
these five students spent the last four weeks of the course twiddling 
thumbs.
Other teams decentralized greatly without providing proper con­
trols (incident 28). In one case a professor had programmed "computerized 
managers" who could take over operations of several functional areas if 
teams were willing to entrust such to them. The following specimen was 
reported to have occurred:
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One firm simply let the managers run the company. Since there was 
no manager for new product development this firm lagged seriously be­
hind others in this area.
A single performance specimen supported critical incident 29 in
Table 5:
A four-iman team had two men handle each quarter and make all de­
cisions. The two who did the work each time were blamed for poor 
results when actually it was the lack of communication and unwilling­
ness of either two to buy information for the other two.
In several instances in decision-making, a person's past exper­
ience in a functional area or industrial setting played an important role 
in game play. In one case a group of undergraduate students tried unsuc­
cessfully to research an industry in order to build their decision strategy
on a knowledge of it. In another, several businessmen who were game par­
ticipants showed a heavy interest in this area. A performance specimen 
substantiating critical incident 41, Table 5, illustrates this point:
Two senior businessmen (over 50) allowed their normal professional 
prejudices to strongly influence them (they were also enjoying some 
alcoholic beverages). The banker resisted spending company funds for 
advertising, while the sales manager wanted to concentrate on it.
The LEADERSHIP factor of Study D covered more unique situations, 
perhaps because of the more extensive reporting or the inclusion of grad­
uate students and businessmen. The following specimen was reported by a 
fellow participant about a businessman playing a game. (See critical in­
cident 52, Table 5.)
In order to develop and maintain "esprit de corps" we thoroughly 
talked out goals, strategy, etc. in the early stages of the game.
One aggressive person kept insisting on establishing certain fixed 
relationships and insisting that we use them. He tended to harass 
the weaker team members. We enthusiastically encouraged him to plot 
his curves and as he picked up the past data and we pushed him for 
relationships, he became so involved that we virtually ignored him as 
we supplied the figures for the games for each run.
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Critical incident 59 and its supporting performance specimen are 
only elicited in games with enriched "off-line" assignments. It is re­
ported about a graduate student by a game administrator:
During labor negotiations, in which nine graduate students repre­
senting corporate management and a faculty member who is a national 
arbitrator representing the president of the union, were discussing 
why the union should get a raise and why the company couldn't afford 
one. Management was arguing that sales and profits were down, while 
the union argued that production was up and that they obviously must 
be selling the product to warrant this. Finally the union president 
said, "If your production is up, as I know it is, and your sales are 
down, as you claim they are, you must be stockpiling for a strike. 
Let's have a look at your inventories." Thè chief corporate negotia­
tor responded with, "What our inventories look like is none of your 
damned business." At which point, the union stormed out of the ses­
sion. They settled at the next session. The faculty member later 
said that if management had given in to releasing their inventory 
figures, he would have run them into the ground.
The point is that this student played his role so well that the 
man across the table from him no longer was a teacher— he was a union, 
who was trying to bleed corporate profits as much as he could.
The performance specimens cited under PUBLIC RELATIONS of Table 5 
described realistic situations which could be cited from industry. Crit­
ical incident 72 included the following specimen:
(Group of Businessmen)— "VP Finance" persuaded his associates 
that the company should contribute a substantial subsidy to a local 
golf course where employees could play, in order to keep the course 
out of bankruptcy.
Incident 73 was supported by an example of a lawsuit:
One team entered into a protracted agreement with the game news­
paper editor. They sued for libel. They lost and their team was 
demoralized.
Incident 74 included the following two ineffective performance 
specimens concerning groups of businessmen game participants:
A bill was filed in the State Legislature to take a tract of land 
by eminent domain and set it aside as a Bird Sanctuary. The VP Fi­
nance persuaded his team to appropriate a fund to lobby against the 
bill since the tract included an area adjacent to the company plant
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which might be needed for expansion. Other teams found ingenious 
(better) ways to work on a compromise; i.e., changing tract slightly, 
using money from sale of land to buy land on other side of plant, etc.
When more than one-third of the labor force is placed on lay-off, 
the computer publishes a letter of concern from the mayor. One bus­
inessman wrote a scathing reply.
Since Studies A, B, and C surveyed what might be termed relatively 
"unsophisticated" games, it is not surprising that factors such as ETHI­
CAL CONDUCT and PUBLIC RELATIONS did not arise. Perhaps it is more 
surprising to find that these functions have been evoked at all by busi­
ness game play. In Study D it was found that one undergraduate game 
participant continued to work in the computer center while participating 
on a team causing his teammates to suspect him of unauthorized knowledge 
about the game scoring methods. Another businessman participant became 
preoccupied with extra-legal methods to win, such as price-fixing and 
collusion with other groups. A third student constantly called the pro­
fessor, questioned him, and tried to elicit unauthorized information.
All of these activities seem indicative of a weak character which might 
serve poorly in ethical confi tations in the business world.
A Compariw n of Behavior Reported in 
Studies A, B, C, and D
Table 6 on the following page depicts the different factors dis­
covered in each study previously discussed and the percentage of 
performance specimens falling in each factor grouping. Eight different 
factor groups were derived from the various studies. It can be seen that 
PLANNING was represented by a significant number of performance specimens 
in every study. The low representation in Study A (Table 2) might be
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF PERFORMANCE SPECIMENS REPORTED FOR EACH 
FACTOR GROUPING FROM VARIOUS RESEARCH STUDIES
Factor
Study A 
(N=117)
Study B 
(N=77)*
Study C 
(N=23)*
Study D 
(N=232)
Planning 5.80 7.80 47.60 18.10
Analysis and Clarification
of Integrated Relation­
ships 6.90 6.50 0.00 16.81
Organization 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50
Decis ion-Making 17.00 37.70 21.70 19.82
Personal and Organiza­
tional Responsibility 48.70 16.90 0.00 7.32
Leadership 21.30 31.20 30.40 22.81
Ethical Conduct 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.29
Public Relations 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.15
TOTAL** 100 .00 100 .00 100.00 100.00
*N = Number of total usable performance specimens received in each
Totals do not add to 100 due to rounding.
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expected since game participants were freshmen in their first business 
course. Most of them had no experience in business organizations and none 
had made a study of the need for formal planning in organizations. Fur­
thermore, their organizations were very unstructured and little attention 
was given to the variable ORGANIZATION, which usually must precede any 
appreciable planning.
Considerably more emphasis was shown the PLANNING factor in Study 
C than in the other studies, which can probably be accounted for in two 
ways. This was a management policy course and students in the course were 
probably admonished to utilize planning- especially long-range planning in 
their game. Furthermore, the observations in Studies A, B, and C were 
made exclusively by peers. They may have had more opportunity to observe 
the lack of planning on the part of their teammates than could the pro­
fessors who contributed most of the observations in Study D. Of the 
performance specimens in this category, 54 per cent were observations of 
the ineffective performance. (See critical incidents 3, 4, 5, and 6 in 
Table 4.)
From Table 6 it can be seen that there are patterns of manage­
rial behavior generated by games that are typical enough to be observed in 
several somewhat dissimilar game sessions. But, although the behavior is 
similar, the way in which it is interpreted may vary somewhat with the 
level of the participant and the kind of observer. For example, in Study 
A, a peer (freshman student) considered planning ahead for only two deci­
sions to be an unusually effective performance specimen. In Study D, 
where participants were on the average at a much higher level in their 
experience and college training, long-range planning seemed to be expected
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by virtue of the fact that, of the performance specimens submitted in 
this category, not a single one appeared as effective performance.
In Table 6 it can be seen that the number of performance specimens 
submitted which could be classified as ANALYSIS AND CLARIFICATION OF IN­
TEGRATED RELATIONSHIPS is similar to the number submitted for the PLANNING 
factor for every study except Study C. Study C elicited no performance 
specimens in this category. Perhaps this was because the sample taken 
(N = 23) was too small to adequately cover typical managerial behaviors.
From a perusal of Table 6 it seems obvious that the important 
managerial function which is either absent or mildly evoked by most busi­
ness games is that of ORGANIZATION. No performance specimens were 
discovered for this area in Studies A, B, and C. In Study D very little 
formal organizational design activity appeared. A few of the more so­
phisticated games picked up in the Study D survey included several levels 
of hierarchy and in them the factor ORGANIZATION seemed more prominent.
A more sophisticated organizational design was hardly possible in Studies 
A, B, and C because of the small number of participants per team (four to 
six) and the lack of a hierarchical structure.
DECISION-MAKING proved to be one of the more significant activi­
ties of the game in terms of frequency of occurrences reported (see 
Table 6). While it cannot be concluded that frequency of reporting de­
notes the criticalness of an area in contributing to managerial success, 
it probably indicates that a large portion of gaming activities are 
devoted to this function.
The PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY factor in Studies 
A and D displays differences in the attitudes and activities of a lower
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level college student game participant and the upper-class or business 
participant. Most freshmen students do not adapt well, nor quickly to 
the organizational environment and they must be prompted constantly to 
accept delegated responsibility. In Table 6 it can be seen that for 
Study A, 48.6 per cent of the performance specimens received dealt with 
this factor. Of these observations, 68 per cent consisted of ineffective 
specimens of behavior, indicating a lack of attention to it.
The percentage of observed performance specimens reported in 
Table 6 seem to indicate that the LEADERSHIP factor was a major activity 
observed in every study. This may be somewhat misleading since most of 
the leadership activities seem to be those of an emerging informal lead­
er, not that of a formally designated manager. In spite of this 
limitation, a successful leadership activity in the game required behav­
ior that would be expected of a person in industry such as the ability to 
persuade, negotiate, communicate well, sustain failure, and generally to 
act in the manner in which a competent leader is expected to behave.
Participants and Observers in Study D 
In Table 7 on the following page, the kind of participant observed 
was broken down and divided into five categories: Undergraduate Student,
Graduate Student, Businessman, Professor, and Other. Most of the "Other" 
category consisted of military personnel. In this table the kind of game 
participants for which specimens were submitted is shown distributed among 
the eight factors of managerial behavior.
The factor PUBLIC RELATIONS was discovered only in games in which 
businessmen were participants. However, from the performance specimens
TABLE 7
NUMBER OF PERFORMANCE SPECIMENS REPORTED FOR EACH KIND OF 
GAME PARTICIPANT FOR EACH FACTOR OF STUDY D
Kind of 
Participant
1 S ^M-l 0) •H  t4•H u C
U (d cd *H(Ü M 00 .£) CO
GO GO M  *H 4-1 dU (U 0 O on Ü o4J (0 •H C d •HT) 0 04 0 ’X) o X) 4JM •H o Cd d o- d Cd0 •H >■ td  CO a. o rHiw CO U 1 (U •H o (UbO W O 0 Cd 0 rH pd pcj
a •H o N O Cd CO rH•H 0) C *H ‘H •H d rH Cd CJg O W 0 CO O cd Q) Ü •H5 rH •H Cd Cd •H CO d ■o •H rH<a cd 4J rH GO O M O Cd . -d .ÛrH q (d 0) 0) <U -H <u 4-1 3PM < O O Q (-J M PH
o
H
Undergraduate Student 19 19 19 24 7 24 2 0 114
Graduate Student 13 10 11 13 5 16 2 0 70
Businessman 13 6 3 7 2 10 1 3 45
Professor 2 2 2 0 2 3 0 0 110
Other 0 2 1 4 0 1 0 0 8
Total does not add to 232 because some specimens were not usable.
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cited earlier in this chapter it can be seen that this factor was probably 
elicited by the specific tasks and problems built into the games played 
rather than because of the kind of participant engaged in game play.
The same is probably true of ETHICAL CONDUCT, which did not appear for 
the Professor and Other categories. There was quite an even distribution 
of performance specimens from all other factors among the various kinds 
of participants.
Table 8, on the following page, illustrates the way in which per­
sons responding within each of the eight factor categories of performance 
categorized their role. Note that these roles are not mutually exclusive 
and that many of the class professors were also acting as the Game Admin- 
is trator.
Comparison of Factors Derived from Study D with 
Criteria of Managerial Effectiveness 
In Chapter II of this thesis it was concluded that behavior must 
be goal-oriented in order for it to be judged effective or ineffective.
The best defined and most acceptable managerial performance criteria 
found in the literature was the "Seven Expressions of Executive Effective­
ness," developed by the Educational Testing Service. These categories 
were explained in Chapter II. In order to try to promote a scattering of 
performance specimens and to sample every possible managerial pattern be­
ing elicited, these expressions were used as reference categories in the 
INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPONDENTS (see Appendix D). However, a pretest showed 
that categories 2 and 4 were so difficult to separate in the minds of 
respondents, they were combined into one category on the instruction sheet. 
Also the wording in category 1 was changed.
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF EACH TYPE OF OBSERVER RESPONDING WITH PERFORMANCE 
SPECIMENS BY FACTORS OF STUDY C
1
1
CO•H N 4J
iw 0) •H *H•H -W C rH
M 0) cO *H
n) M 60 40
Kind of 
Observer
rH Û0 U <U 
W  CO
nj C A C:
60
CJ
•H
M -HO g
rQ O
XIÜ
3
CJ
o•HXI
CÎ M *H o cO C cx c cO
nl x: •H s cO CO CX o rHCO 1 Q) •H o CU
00 CO O 0 <0 CJ rH OCj 43 PJ
a •H o N o CO CO iH
•H CO CJ "H •H •H CJ r-4 w cO u 4(c %  O H CJ CO O cO 0) CJ rH
0 iH *H CCJ CO •H CO CJ T3 •H rH CO
0 CO iH 60 CJ 1-1 o CO 43 43 XIrH d cO CU M 0) QJ *H CU XI 3 o
Ph <  O pcj o O fX XJ r-J W P4 H oU )
Fellow Participant 6 5 4 3 4 11 0 0 33
Game Administrator 
or Advisor 26 27 17 29 7 32 2 3 143
Researcher 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 70
Class Professor 19 22 15 28 6 24 4 0 118
Total includes overlapping since some observers engaged in dual roles
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Since the instructions to Study D also included an OTHER category 
which probably required less mental effort on the part of the respondents 
to use, it can be presumed that at least some effort and thought went in­
to their decision to put a performance specimen in one of the other five 
categories.
There are now two independent categorizations of these perfor­
mance specimens— one derived by the writer and one designated by the 
respondents to Study D. Table 9, on the following page, displays the 
number of performance specimens classified under the Expressions of Execu­
tive Effectiveness (simplified) compared with the writer's independent 
grouping of such factors into eight factor categories. In each case 
there was quite a good grouping of specimens by some respondent category 
(vertically) and some factor groupings (horizontally).
Note in Table 9 that respondents designated 25 performance spec­
imens as contributing to Development of High (or Low) Morale which were 
categorized by the writer under LEADERSHIP. This combination not only 
shows good agreement in classification, but it also indicates the factors 
derived by the writer representing managerial activities that could be 
observed, while the Expressions of Executive Effectiveness denote the re­
sults which respondents thought would derive from these activities. For 
this reason, the fact that a factor grouping of performance specimens by 
the writer also showed up as a rather well-defined grouping of Effective 
Expressions of Executive Effectiveness in industry by the respondents 
lends some relevance to the thought that the factor groupings derived may 
in fact be the activities critical to success or failure in management as 
well as in business games.
TABLE 9
NUMBER OF PERFORMANCE SPECIMENS DESIGNATED BY EACH CATEGORY REPRESENTING EXPRESSIONS 
OF EXECUTIVE EFFECTIVENESS BY RESPONDENTS OF STUDY D COMPARED TO 
FACTORS DERIVED FROM AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF STUDY D
Expressions of 
Executive Effectiveness 
(Designated by Respondents)
Factors Derived by Writer
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Contributions to Company Strategy
Realistic Planning and Organizing 
for the Future (or Lack of Such)
Development of High (or Low)
Morale
Development of Competent Sub­
ordinates (or Lack of Such)
Fostering of Good Public Relations 
(or Lack of Such)
Other
23
13
14
24
10
1
1
0
0
2
0
0
2
1
0
25
10
2
6
0
3
3
1
49
60
53
19
9
13
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Summary
In this chapter the research methodology was discussed and the 
returns from the four questionnaire studies were reported. The data col­
lected was summarized in tabular form and a percentage breakdown of 
performance specimens by "factor" grouping and "critical incidents" was 
given in Tables 2 , 3, 4, and 5. A comparison of the managerial effective­
ness criteria described in Chapter II was made with the "factors" derived 
from performance specimens received in Study D. Some similarity between 
this independent criteria designation by respondents and the factors de­
rived by the writer appears to be present.
Chapter VI will present the conclusions and implications drawn 
from the thesis.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to describe systematically the be­
havior being elicited by business games, giving consideration to their 
possible use as predictors of managerial success. The specific hypothe­
sis was stated as follows: "It is hypothesized that the critical incident
technique, which has been used in several instances to develop perfor­
mance evaluation instruments and job requirements, can be used success­
fully to describe the managerial behavior being elicited by business 
games."
Other important questions, upon which this study is designed to 
shed some light and which doubtlessly will be the subject of further and 
more intensive research, are:
Can a clear, well-defined path be defined for research in the 
area of predicting managerial success on the job from behavioral patterns 
elicited by business games? If so, what is the best criterion available 
in the literature for a measure of managerial success?
How well can business game environments and game developments be 
controlled?
Can a relationship be observed between behavior sampled from game 
participants and criteria of successful managerial performance in indus­
try?
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Conclusions
The findings from this research will be presented as they appeared 
chronologically in the text of this thesis.
Criterion Development 
In Chapter I a model was given indicating the steps necessary to 
develop business games as predictors of managerial effectiveness in indus­
try. Criteria of managerial effectiveness were selected from the numerous 
studies reviewed in the literature and are presented in Chapter II. The 
Educational Testing Service's Seven Expressions of Executive Effectiveness 
seemed to be the best expression of these criteria since they were re­
lated to the goals of an organization required in the model developed in 
the thesis.
Control Over Game Development 
In Chapter III, a synthesis of control measures for game environ­
ments was suggested by a review of literature on business games. Four 
major game characteristics were discovered to be important to environ­
mental control; the industry simulated, the hierarchical level simulated, 
the business function simulated, and the organizational climate simulated. 
Several techniques were suggested as possible control devices for these 
characteristics, such as the business game case and the in-basket tech­
nique. It was further suggested that these game characteristics should 
be carefully described and adjusted to the job profile from Table 1, page 24, 
for which success was to be predicted.
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A Description of Business Game Behavior 
A review of previous attempts to use business games and other 
simulations as predictors of managerial success is given in Chapter IV.
The rationale for the critical incident technique for collecting and 
assimilating performance specimens was explained. In Figure 1, page 6, 
of Chapter I, a more complete description was given of the way in which 
games might be developed for predicting managerial success in industry.
A summary of the behavioral statements defined as critical inci­
dents and larger categories of behavior defined as factors are given in 
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter V. In the following table the eight 
different factors discovered important to individual effectiveness in bus­
iness games are reported. The number and percentage of the total 
performance specimens from Studies A, B, C, and D are given to the right 
of each factor.
TABLE 10
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERFORMANCE SPECIMENS 
REPORTED FOR EACH FACTOR OF STUDIES A, B, C, AND D
Factor A
Studies 
B C D
Total
N
Per Cent 
(N = 449)
Planning
Analysis and Clarification of
7 6 11 42 66 14.70
Integrated Relationships 8 5 0 39 52 11.58
Organization 0 0 0 28 28 6.24
Decision-Making
Personal and Organizational
20 29 5 46 100 22.27
Responsibility 57 13 0 16 86 19.15
Leadership 25 24 7 53 109 24.27
Ethical Conduct 0 0 0 3 3 .67
Public Relations 0 0 0 5 5 1.11
TOTAL 117 77 23 232 449 100.00
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These categories include the functions vital to management as 
cited by most leading authorities. Performance specimens reported also 
include most behavior discovered in the literature on business games. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the critical incident technique has prov­
en successful in systematically describing the managerial behavior taking 
place in business games.
Game Behavior Compared With Managerial 
Behavior in Industry 
Although eight factor categories of managerial behavior discovered 
in Study D include all of the major functions of management cited by the 
more prominent textbooks in this field, some were found to be more strong­
ly supported with performance specimens than others. In all of the 
studies performed, the three managerial activities, PLANNING, DECISION­
MAKING, and LEADERSHIP, were frequently observed in games, judged by the 
number of performance specimens submitted. In Study D, which can probably 
be considered somewhat representative of game play nationwide, performance 
specimens supporting the factors, ANALYSIS AND CLARIFICATION OF INTEGRATED 
RELATIONSHIPS and ORGANIZATION, were also reported frequently. Based on 
the number of performance specimens reported in Study D, the single most 
prevalent managerial activity taking place in business games appears to 
be the factor defined as LEADERSHIP. However, since games do not usually 
have well-defined authority structures, these were most frequently the ac­
tivities of emerging informal leaders. Perhaps the reason for the great 
emphasis on this function is due to the fact that games tend to lack the 
formal organizational structure and recognized authoritarian hierarchy of 
businesses, making them heavily dependent upon Informal personal leadership.
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The factor ORGANIZATION appeared only in Study D. From the kinds 
of performance specimens in which it arose, it can be concluded that it 
is not elicited frequently by the less sophisticated business games. Ac­
tivities calling for the implementation of plans and procedures were not 
frequently found in the PLANNING, DECISION-MAKING, or LEADERSHIP functions.
Recommendations
Many of the weaknesses of games in duplicating managerial be­
havior seem to arise from three faults: (3.) most business games do not
have more than one level of management hierarchy, (2) formal delegation 
of authority is usually absent, and (3) most games make use of aggregate 
variables which assume perfect implementation of a decision after quanti­
ties are designated. Therefore, it is suggested that special attention be 
given to improving realism in these areas if games are to be used for pre­
dictive purposes.
The critical incidents derived in this study and presented in 
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter V should be integrated into one perfor­
mance appraisal form to be used for evaluating participants in business 
games. Once administered to a number of persons, an item validity analy­
sis could be performed to determine which incidents are most critical to 
success or failure. The superfluous incidents could be removed and sug­
gestions could be solicited for new performance specimens which could be 
added each time the form is administered.
It is recommended that the model shown in Figure 1 of Chapter I 
be exploited further by future research in this area. Since the critical 
incident technique has shown promise as a vehicle for systematically
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collecting information as to managerial type behavior in games, a study 
similar to the one described in this thesis should be performed for m a n ­
agerial work in industry. The critical incidents collected from managers 
in industry should then be organized into a performance appraisal form 
similar to the one mentioned above. Once designed and administered to a 
number of managers whose work history is available, this instrument could 
be used as a criterion of success against which the game performance ap­
praisal form suggested above could be further validated.
After a reasonably reliable and sufficiently broad set of inci­
dents is obtained, validity studies should be performed by having 
managers, whose work in industry have been evaluated by the critical in­
cident appraisal form, play games in which their performance could be 
evaluated by the instrument evolved from this study.
Numerous correlation checks would then be possible with the above 
information. To mention only one possibility, since critical incident 
performance evaluation forms can be scored numerically, all participants 
on a team could have their scores summed and this could be compared with 
an objective game score on such items as profits and ROI. Analysis of 
these two scores might possibly lead to a determination of which individ­
ual factors and incidents were most important to success or failure in 
various games. Hopefully this would allow one to determine which individ­
ual made the greatest contribution to team success. A model such as that 
of Vance suggested in Chapter IV could be used to determine team success. 
The critical incident appraisal form might be used to distribute a team 
score among individual participants.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE HANDOUT TO FRESHMAN INTRODUCTION 
TO BUSINESS STUDENTS
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INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS 
Fall 69
NAME Team #
INSTRUCTIONS: Please think of an action (or series of actions) of
a fellow student in a business simulation game that you considered 
to be unusually effective or ineffective. Describe exactly what 
occurred below. Please give as many effective and ineffective situ­
ations as you can, but be sure to give at least one of each. (Do 
not include the student's name that you are discussing.)
UNUSUALLY EFFECTIVE
UNUSUALLY INEFFECTIVE
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONÎIAIRE HANDOUT TO JUNIOR-LEVEL 
MARKETING MANAGEMENT STUDENTS
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MARKETING MANAGEMENT 
Fall 69
NAME__________________________________________ Industry____________ Team //_
INSTRUCTIONS: Please think of an action (or series of actions) of a
fellow student in a business simulation game that you considered to 
be unusually effective or ineffective. Describe exactly what occur­
red below. Please give as many effective and ineffective situations 
as you can, but be sure to give at least one of each. (Do not in­
clude the student's name that you are discussing.)
UNUSUALLY EFFECTIVE
UNUSUALLY INEFFECTIVE
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE HANDOUT TO SENIOR-LEVEL 
MANAGEMENT POLICIES STUDENTS
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Return to :
J. B. Keys
O klahom a Christian College
R oute 1, Box 141
O klahom a City, Oklahoma 73111
INCIDENT ON EFFECTIVE/INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR (Write below )
(Circle One)
C A T E G O R Y : I
P L E A S E  C H E C K
P a r tic ip a n t O b served :  
U n d er g ra d u a te  S tu d e n t  
G r a d u a te  S tu d e n t  
B u sin essm a n  
P r o fesso r
O th er  _________________
II III IV VI (C ircle o n e  - S e e  I N S T R U C T IO N S , fir st p a g e )
Y o u r  R o le :
F e llo w  P a r tic ip a n t  
G a m e A d m in is tr a to r  or  
A d v iso r  
R esea rch er  
C lass P r o fe sso r  
O th er  _________________
INCIDENT ON EFFECTIVE/INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR (Write below )
(Circle One)
C A T E G O R Y : 1
P L E A S E  C H E C K
P a r tic ip a n t O b served :  
U n d er g ra d u a te  S tu d e n t  
G r a d u a te  S tu d e n t  
B u sin essm a n  
P r o fesso r
O th er  _________________
II HI IV VI (C ircle o n e  • S e e  I N S T R U C T IO N S , first p a g e )
Y o u r  R o le :
F e llo w  P a r tic ip a n t  
G a m e  A d m in is tr a to r  or  
A d v iso r  
R esea rch er  
C lass P r o fe sso r  
O th er  _________________
Name and Address to which summary o f results should be sent:
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Christian College 124AREA CODE 405 478-1661 /  OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA 73111
DIVISION 
OF B U SIN ESS
December 6, 1969
Mr. Richard H. Rawdon 
American Management Association 
Saranac Lake, New York 12983
Dear Mr. Rawdon:
The enclosed request for information concerning business simulation 
gaming is being sent to you because you have been suggested as a 
person having experience in this area of teaching and research.
As you are probably aware, in order for progress to continue in gaming, 
a procedure needs to be developed for systematically describing the 
types of behavior that games are capable of evoking. Once the behavior 
patterns elicited by games are systematically defined, the continuation 
of research projects in this area can be facilitated. This study is an 
attempt to make some progress at such a description. The data being 
collected here \fill be used for a Ph.D. dissertation, tentatively entitled 
"The Development of a Systematic Description of the Behavior of Participants 
in Business Simulation Gaming."
As a courtesy to you, I am enclosing a recently compiled, categorized 
bibliography on business simulation gaming and related topics. Your 
contribution will be coded and classified and anonymity is guaranteed.
Due to the limited number of professors and businessmen with gaming 
experience, your assistance in this study will be very important to its 
success and will be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,^
J. Bernard Keys 
Chairman
jrl
Enclosures
P.S. All respondents will receive a digested summary of the results of 
this study.
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307 W est Brooks, Room 106A c o l l e g e  o f  b u s in e s s  a d m in is t r a t io n
N orm an, Oklahoma 73069 department of management
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  OF O K L A H O M A
D e c e m b e r  6, 1969
D e a r  Colleague:
Professor B e r n a r d  Keys, a Ph.D. candidate 
working under m y  supervision, is conducting 
a survey concerning behavioral patterns in
m a n a g e m e n t  g a m i n g  as a part of his dis­
sertation research. W e  have had s o m e  
difficulty in identifying all professors wh o 
have had experience with this instructional 
device and are asking your assistance with 
this problem.
Will you please ask the appropriate person 
in your department (it m a y  be yourself) to 
fill out and return the enclosed questionnaire 
to Professor Key s  ?
Please be careful to include the cover letter, 
instructions, and questionnaire as you 
forward the materials.
m uch.T h a n k
L. D. Bishop V 
Professor of M a n a g e m e n t
jjh
enclosure
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AREA CODE 406 478-1661 /  OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73111
DIVISION 
OF BUSINESS
December 6, 1969
Dear Professor:
The enclosed request for information concerning business simulation 
gaming is being sent to you because you have been suggested as a 
person having experience in this area of teaching and research.
As you are probably aware, in order for progress to continue in gaming, 
a procedure needs to be developed for systematically describing the 
types of behavior that games are capable of evoking. Once the behavior 
patterns elicited by games are systematically defined, the continuation 
of research projects in this area can be facilitated. This study is an 
attempt to make some progress at such a description. The data being 
collected here will be used for a Ph.D. dissertation, tentatively entitled 
"The Development of a Systematic Description of the Behavior of Partici­
pants in Business Simulation Gaming."
As a courtesy to you, I am enclosing a recently compiled, categorized 
bibliography on business simulation gaming and related topics. Your 
contribution will be coded and classified and anonymity is guaranteed.
Due to the limited number of professors and businessmen with gaming 
experience, your assistance in this study will be very important to its 
success and will be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
J. Bernard Keys 
Chairman
Imk
Enclosures
P.S. All respondents will receive a digested summary of the results of 
this study.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR RESPONDENT
Please describe briefly an incident concerning the action o f  a participant in a business simula­
tion game, that you  observed or learned about first hand, which in your opinion was an ex­
ample of unusually effective game performance  (or unusually ineffective, as the case may be). 
As you write the incident in one o f  the blanks on the follow ing pages, please describe exactly  
what occurred, giving on ly  enough detail to  explain why the act was unusually effective or 
ineffective. (See exam ples back o f this page.)
Please classify your response by circling the Rom an numeral at the top of each incident which 
corresponds to  the appropriate categories helow.
NOTE: Although we would like very m uch to receive four incidents from each respondent, 
we would w elcom e any number o f  responses. The exam ples from a pretest on the back of  
this page might help to clarify this request.
CATEGORIES
1. C O N T R I B L ' T K ' X S  T O  C O M I ’. A . W  S I  I t . X I E G ' l  . Thi < c^t let i iny ir.riucii’h d o c i - i o n  o n  pr iCf ,  p r o d u c : ,  
c h o ic e , p r o d u c t io n  volunu*.  e t c . .  ih. i i  a r e  l u m  o . o u r e  a n d  w h i c h  r e ' Ui i e d  in a p r o f i l  i e f f ec t i v e  i o r  loss  
( in e ffe c t iv e  ).
11. REALISTIC PLANNING AND ORGANIZING FOR THE FUTURE (OR LACK OF SUCH).
T h e  resu lts  h ere  are v ie w e d  in term.s o f  o rgan iz tU ion a l s u b -g o a ls , su c h  as d efin in g  clear o b je c t iv e s , p o lic ie s , and  
p la n s, and d e v e lo p in g  sta n d a rd  o p era tin g  m e th o d s , s y s te m s , and  p rocedu re .s  th a t c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  
o f  a tea m . In c lu d e s  th e  d es ig n  o f  o r g a n iz a tio n a l s tr u c tu r e , d e c is io n -m a k in g  te c h n iq u e s  an d  an a ly sis  for  d e ­
c is io n s .
III. DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH (OR LOW) MOR.VLE. I n c id e n ts  fa llin g  in th is  ca te g o r y  w o u ld  in c lu d e  
o n e s  b y  w h ic h  th e p a r tic ip a n t d e v e lo p e d  tea m  sp ir it , fo s te r e d  en th u s ia sm  for team  g o a ls  and  in creased  th e  
g r o u p ’s r e s is ta n c e  to  fr u stra tio n . It a lso  in c lu d es  su c h  th in g s  as a v o id in g  p erson a l c o n f l ic t s ,  o b serv in g  c u s to m s  
an d  tr a d it io n s , d isp la y in g  lo y a l ty ,  e tc .
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETENT SUBO RDINATES (OR LACK OF SUCH). A lth o u g h  w e
r e c o g n iz e  th a t  th is  m a y  b e  a d if f ic u l t  area fo r  g a m e s  t o  s im u la te , it  is an  im p o rta n t o n e , an d  th e r e fo r e  w o r th  
e x p lo r in g . It w o u ld  in c lu d e  a c t io n s  tak en  b y  fo rm a l o r  i n f o r m a l  lead ers th a t fo s tered  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
m an ageria l o r  te c h n ic a l c o m p e te n c e  o f  p eer s  a n d /o r  su b o r d in a te s .
V. FOSTERING OF GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS (OR LACK OF SUCH). T h e  first th o u g h ts  on
th is  ca te g o r y  m a y  b e  th a t  it is s im p ly  u n r e la te d  t o  th e  g a m e  e n v ir o n m e n t. H ow ever , it s e e m s  to  b e  an area  
w h ic h  is very  im p o r ta n t to  u p p er -lev e l m a n a g e m e n t an d  th e r e fo r e  w e  w ish  to  e x p lo r e  a n y  p o ss ib le  s im u la tio n  
o f  su c h . P erh ap s th e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  an n u a l r e p o r ts  o r  p r o m o tio n a l program s in in te r fa c in g  p ro jec ts  m ig h t  
h a v e  b een  to u c h e d  o n  th is  area . P erh ap s p r o je c ts  th a t  m ig h t  c a u se  h arm  or b e n e f it  to  a c o m m u n ity  h a v e  b een  
s im u la te d , s u c h  as b u ild in g  a ir and  w a ter  f i l tr a t io n  s y s t e m s  to  p rev e n t p o llu t io n , or d e s ig n in g  p ro d u c ts  th a t  
w o u ld  n o t  l i t t e r  c o m m u n it ie s  (p a y in g  fo r  re tu rn  o f  u se d  c o n ta in e r s , e tc .) .
VI. OTHER. P lease u se  th is  c a teg o r y  for a n y  b e h a v io r  w h ic h  y o u  are u nc e r t a i n  a b o u t  ca t egor i z i ng .
128
EXAMPLES FROM A PRETEST
Return to  :
J. B. Keys
Oklahoma Christian College
R oute 1, Box 141
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111
INCIDENT ON (EFFECT1VE)1NEFFECT1VE BEHAVIOR (Write below)
(Circle One)
C A T E G O R Y : CD
P L E A S E  C H E C K
P a r tic ip a n t O b served :  
U n d er g ra d u a te  S tu d e n t  
G ra d u a te  S tu d e n t  
B u sin essm a n  
P ro fesso r
O th er _________________
III IV
Y o u r  R o le :
F e llo w  P a r tic ip a n t --------
G am e A d m in istr a to r  or
A d v iso r   2£_
R esea rch er  _____
C lass P r o fe ss o r   2L.
O th er _________________________
V I (C irc le  o n e  • S e e  IN S T R U C T IO N S , first p a g e)
One o f  m y  graduate students  determined that although  
everyone was pricing products  in the range o f  $ 1 0 0 0 — 
$1,100, dem and was inelastic and would  sustain a price  
o f  over $10 ,000 .  He was right! Because he had the guts  
to make this judgm ental decision he ou tdis tanced his 
nearest com pe t i to rs  by $250 ,000 . He did  n o t  sell m any  
units, but then he d id  not have to. (We changed the  
elasticity variable.)
INCIDENT ON EFFECTIVE/^NEFFECTIVE^BEHAVIOR ( Write below)
(Circle One)
C A T E G O R Y : I
P L E A S E  C H E C K
P a r tic ip a n t O b served :  
U n d er g ra d u a te  S tu d e n t  
G rad u ate  S tu d e n t  
B u sin essm a n  
P r o fesso r
O th er  _________________
IV
Y o u r  R o le :
F e llo w  P a r tic ip a n t  
G am e A d m in istr a to r  o r  
A d v iso r  
R esea rch er  
C lass P r o fe sso r  
O th er _________________
V I (C irc le  o n e  ■ S e e  IN S T R U C T IO N S , first p a g e)
One dynam ic  type  o f  individual assumed leadership o f  a 
five-man team. He used others and did not effectively  
communicate. Interactional problems among the group  
members became acute. One subordinate remarked to  
this individual, "Just because you  are an officer in the  
Guard on Sundays doesn't swing any weight here!"
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Return to:
J. B. Keys
Oklahoma Christian College
Route 1, Box 141
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111
INCIDENT ON EFFECTIVE/INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR (Write below)
(Circle One)
C A T E G O R Y : I
^ase check
P a r tic ip a n t O b serv ed :  
U n d er g ra d u a te  S tu d e n t  
G r a d u a te  S tu d e n t  
B u sin essm a n  
P r o fesso r  
O th er
III IV VI (C irc le  o n e  - S e e  IN S T R U C T IO N S , fir st p a g e)
Y o u r  R o le :
F e llo w  P a r tic ip a n t  
G a m e  A d m in is tr a to r  or  
A d v iso r  
R esea rch er  
C lass P r o fe sso r  
O th e r  _________________
INCIDENT ON EFFECTIVE/INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR (Write below)
(Circle One)
C A T E G O R Y : I
P L E A S E  C H E C K
P a r tic ip a n t O b serv ed :  
U n d er g ra d u a te  S t u d e n t  
G r a d u a te  S tu d e n t  
B u sin essm a n  
P r o fe ss o r  
O th e r
Y o u r  R o le :
F e llo w  P a r tic ip a n t  
G a m e  A d m in is tr a to r  or  
A d v iso r  
R e sea rch er  
C lass P r o fesso r  
O th e r  ------------  - -
III IV VI (C irc le  o n e  • S e e  IN S T R U C T IO N S , fir st p a g e)
Name and Address to which summary o f  results should be sent:
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A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON BUSINESS SIMULATION GAMES SINCE 1960
J . Bernard Keys 
Chairman, Division of Business 
Oklahoma Christian College
A Six-Page (89-item) Bibliography 
Mailed with Questionnaire
